# The Political Legacy of 19th Century Politicization and Repression in Southeastern France

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This paper investigates the long-run impact of 19th-century politicization and political repression on electoral outcomes by exploiting the natural experiment along the 1815-1860 border separating France from the Duchy of Savoy and the Nice County. Thanks to a spatial discontinuity design, I estimate the legacy of the early 19th-century politicization and the 1851 political repression against Republicans in southeastern France on electoral outcomes. Results suggest that these different historic trajectories translated into a preference for radical Republicans on the French side during the election of 1871. This preference persists until nowadays, as the French side voted more for left-wing candidates in both presidential and legislative elections between 1995 and 2022. Using first-hand archives data on repressed citizens, results indicate that politicization. Further analyses suggest that repressed political dynasties, emigration generated by the repression, and a relatively unmixed population can explain how and why these historic events continue to influence electoral results.

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# 1 Introduction

December 1851. Jean-Marie Labruyère, also named "Chacaille", was a mailman in the French department of Ain. "Chacaille" was also known to be a staunch defender of the Republic, and was very likely to be part of a secret montagnard club<sup>1</sup>. A few days after Napoleon III's coup that ended the 2nd Republic, "Chacaille" was frightened of the repression suffered by people who shared his ideas and went into exile in Switzerland. His fate was however less tragic than some of his companions: some of them were sent into penal colonies (*i.e. bagne*), expelled from their communes, or even executed. This particular example taken from the archive work of Devos (1992) leads to question the legacy of politicization<sup>2</sup> and the effectiveness of political repression<sup>3</sup>. Did "Chacaille"s disappearance generate fear among his companions, prompting them to moderate their political stances? Or did it trigger indignation and drive them towards more extreme positions? Perhaps "Chacaille's" departure simply reduced the number of Republican activists, consequently diminishing local support for their cause? One might wonder about the effect of the early 19th-century politicization and the 1851 political repression in southeastern France on election results. This question can be addressed by using the natural experiment along the 1815-1860 border separating France from the Duchy of Savoy and Nice County, and comparing homogeneous communes in a spatial regression discontinuity setting.

Broadly speaking, understanding the impact of political repression on electoral outcomes is important as it causes substantial damage. Since political repression is usually linked to traumatic events, one of its most obvious effects is on psychological health. Munczek and Tuber (1998), Sales et al. (2000), and Stammel et al. (2013) found that being a victim of political repression leads to long-run psychological disorders<sup>4</sup> Political repression can also harm economic outcomes by eroding trust. As denoted by Nunn (2009), trust is a determinant of long-term economic development. Berniell et al. (2021), Lichter et al. (2021), Booth et al. (2022), and Nikolova et al. (2022) found that exposure to diverse forms of political repression <sup>5</sup> reduces trust. They show a persistent effect over time, as this mistrust is transmitted over generations through parental socialization.

Questioning the impact of political repression on electoral outcomes is also a contem-

 $<sup>^{1}</sup>Montagnard$  clubs were clandestine Republican organizations during the first half of the 19th century.  $^{2}$ Politicization is defined as the process of becoming politically aware.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Political repression is defined by Davenport (2007) as "the act of a state entity controlling a citizenry by force for political reasons, particularly for the purpose of restricting or preventing the citizenry's ability to take part in the political life of a society".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> such as depression, anxiety, aggressive feelings, post-traumatic symptoms, and prolonged grief disorder.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>such as being spied on by the Stasi in East Germany, undergo the cultural revolution in China or simply knowing about the gulag forced labor camps in USSR

porary issue. When looking at current global trends, one may expect political repression to intensify in the future. According to the political terror scale index (Gibney et al., 2022), low-income countries<sup>6</sup> went from a context where "There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. (...) Political murder is rare." to a situation where "Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted."<sup>7</sup>. A similar trend can be observed with the Freedom House's data, where political liberty for the press scores (*i.e.* a specific form of political repression) deteriorated for every income category between 2001 and 2016. This information suggests that political repression may increase in the near future, even in developed countries.

Despite having all these negative effects, is political repression at least efficient in one of its main purposes, *i.e.* to eliminate the politicization previously carried out by the opposition<sup>8</sup>? According to the psychological literature, the answer is not obvious. When confronted with political repression, individuals can have opposite reactions. On the one hand, political repression may suppress the opposition by generating fear among the dissidents (Young, 2019). The latter would become risk-averse and temper their political opposition. On the other hand, political repression may increase the perceived distance between the oppressed group and the prosecutors, making the dissidents more attached to their social group (Nugent, 2020). In this situation, political repression would generate a more united and polarized opposition.

Answering this question is also not easy from a statistical standpoint. As mentioned by Walden and Zhukov (2020), estimating the effect of political repression presents methodological issues. Since political repression is most of the time directed toward a specific group, such studies can be subject to selection bias, hence making it difficult to have a suitable counterfactual. However, the political repression in southeastern France during the 19th century can be a natural experiment that bypasses such issues. I make the argument that the Duchy of Savoy and the Nice County switched exogenously between France and the Kingdom of Piedmont Sardinia in both 1815 and 1860. During these 45 years, a population with homogeneous political and geographic characteristics (even though they were previously part of separate political territories), went through different historic paths in these two distinct political entities, all within an era when contemporary political opinions were shaped. They notably lived different exposure to politicization and political repression: The French side politicized in part through secret Republican clubs and faced political repression, while the Italian side politicized rather

 $<sup>^{6}\</sup>mathrm{According}$  to World-Bank income classification

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Source: https://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Documentation.html

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>another purpose of repression could be to increase the opportunity cost of engaging a conflict, hence reducing the incentive to rebel.

on the basis of affiliation or opposition to France/Italy, and managed to avoid repression.

Using the election results at the municipality level (retrieved from the French ministry of the interior) between 1995 and 2022, I resort to a spatial regression discontinuity design by comparing the electoral outcomes of homogeneous communes along the 1815-1860 Savoy and Nice border. This econometric method seems very adapted to the subject, as it allows to compare communes that are homogenous in characteristics and to account for geographic spillover. This econometric approach appears well-suited to the topic since it enables the comparison of communes with similar characteristics while also accounting for geographic spillovers. Results indicate that Republican politicization in the 19th century led to a significantly stronger preference for radical Republican candidates on the French side during the 1871 legislative election. It also had long-run impacts since the French side votes significantly more toward left-wing candidates, *i.e.* the ideological heirs of 19th-century republicanism Julliard (2014), during legislative and presidential elections between 1995 and 2022. This result on its own provides little information about the effects of political repression. Therefore, using archives work from Devos (1992), I introduce the number of repressed individuals by communes in the specification. Results indicate that municipalities where citizens went through tougher repression have a significantly lower preference for left-wing candidates. This negative impact is however not large enough to offset the initial politicization effect. I then try to explain how and why the effects of politicization and repression persist over the long run. The longterm legacy of repression is explored with repressed political dynasties and repressionrelated emigration. Both communes where a mayor shared its name with a repressed citizen within a 20km radius and communes with repressed citizens that emigrated<sup>9</sup> have a significantly lower preference for left-wing candidates. The persistence of the effects can be explained by the lack of population mixing since there is less difference in terms of voting behavior between communes that are located in the same academy and employment area, *i.e.* areas where individuals from both sides of the border have mingled through higher education and/or at work.

This study contributes to the literature addressing the impact of political repression on electoral outcomes. Most of the papers composing this strand investigated the repression during the Soviet era and came to different conclusions. Kapelko and Markevich (2014), Lupu and Peisakhin (2017), and Rozenas et al. (2017) found that Soviet repression had long-term impacts, since the oppressed areas or ethnic groups are less likely to vote for pro-Russian parties until nowadays, hence validating the polarization hypothesis of Nugent (2020). Regarding these studies, political repression would be counter-productive and would not reach its primary purpose. However, based on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Either self-exile or forced emigration to detention in French Guiana or Algeria.

same context of Stalin-era repression, Zhukov and Talibova (2018) came to the opposite conclusion. They found that more heavily repressed communities had a lower turnout in recent elections, validating the Young (2019) fear hypothesis. In the context of political repression during China's cultural revolution, Wang (2021) even reconciles both intuitions, as individuals living in more repressed localities have more anti-regime attitudes, but less contentious behaviors (measured by protests). Despite contrasting results, the whole literature confirms that political repression has effects that span decades and generations, mainly through parental socialization mechanisms (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Avdeenko and Siedler, 2017).

The findings of this paper confirm that past political repression has a long-run impact, and brings additional support for the Young (2019) hypothesis. It also complements the literature in a number of ways. First, it adds original first-hand data from Devos (1992)'s archival work, which allows a more granular individual dimension to be exploited in the measurement of repression. Then, it considers another context than Soviet or Communist China, *i.e.* 19th century France's, in which political repression was less indiscriminate and more targeted. Finally, this study also offers a broader perspective since the events considered here date back more than a century, whereas most studies in this literature have considered events that occurred in the mid-20th century.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the historical context of southeastern France in the 19th century. Section 3 introduces the data, the empirical strategy, and discontinuity tests. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 explores the channels, and Section 6 concludes.

# 2 Historical context

#### 2.1 1815: Congress of Vienna's separation

In 1815, after years of incessant wars against European coalitions, Napoleon I was defeated. This loss marked the end of the French Empire, whose borders were redrawn at the Congress of Vienna. During the latter, the Duchy of Savoy and the Nice County were given back to the Kingdom of Piedmont Sardinia<sup>10</sup>. Figure A1 presents the boundaries of the mentioned regions, as well as the 1815-1860 border separating them from France.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Wars, treaties, and alliances made Savoy and Nice either an independent political entity (the Savoy Duchy, evolving in the Piedmont Sardinia Kingdom), part of the French kingdom, or even occupied by the Spanish Kingdom. In total, Savoy and Nice have been occupied or annexed seven times by France (1536 to 1559, 1600 to 1601, 1630 to 1631, 1690 to 1696, 1703 to 1713, 1792 to 1815, and 1860 to nowadays. Figure A2 in the appendix shows a timeline of the various political entities to which the Duchy of Savoy and Nice County have belonged over the course of history. Table A1 presents the changes in political entities over the territory and provides a summary of the reasons behind these modifications.

From then on, the two regions and France experienced two different historical paths during a few decades that were crucial to the structuration of contemporary political opinions.

#### 2.2 Southeastern France (1815-1860)

Between 1815 and 1830, France experienced a return to the monarchy with the Second Restoration. The regime then evolved into a constitutional monarchy with the July Monarchy between 1830 and 1848. Since censal suffrage<sup>11</sup> was the rule during this period, very few republican (*i.e.* left-wing) politicians were present in the government. But southeastern France became a fertile ground for republican ideas, as local politicians formed *Montagnard* clubs. The latter were particularly present in rural areas and took the form of discussion clubs, more or less formally declared as political clubs, where mostly young men met and discussed politics. Margadant (1979) explains the development of these clubs in southeastern France for two reasons. First, this region is home to more Protestants, historically skeptical towards the monarchy and therefore more inclined to be republican. The second is linked to the social character of these clubs: once established, they evolved into hubs for the informal socialization of young men within the village, inflating the importance of these political clubs. These clubs gave Republican politicians the opportunity to present the main lines of their programs, including the abolition of the wine tax, the shift of the taxation's burden from the poor to the rich, low-interest loans through state banks, or free usage of common lands. This program appealed to both the middle and working classes, from farm workers and craftsmen to agricultural landowners, and gave these rural populations their first form of politicization (Margadant, 1979).

Their hopes were almost fulfilled with the Revolution of 1848 and the installation of the Second Republic. Figure 1 presents the vote for democrat-socialists per department for the legislative election of 1849<sup>12</sup>, retrieved from Bouillon (1956) (democrat-socialists were the most radically republican political offer at the time). It seems that *Montagnard* societies in the southeast had short-run effects since these departments mostly voted for democrat-socialist deputies. However, the conservative Party of Order won the majority of parliament's seats. The state of political freedom is back to conditions that prevailed under the July Monarchy, with political reunions once again banned. Republicans had to go back to underground organizations and formed secret societies, once again particularly in the southeastern part of France. However, with the opportunity of winning elections, they intensified their propaganda and became what can today be considered

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>A form of voting rights in which eligibility to vote is determined by an individual's economic or property status. In this period, the right to vote was linked to the payment of a tax.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>With universal male suffrage.

the precursor of a mass political party<sup>13</sup> (Vigier, 1963; Margadant, 1979; Agulhon, 1979, 1992).

Figure 1: 1849 legislative election results - vote for Democrat-Socialists



This new organization gave them enough leverage to react to the 1851 event. Louis Napoleon-Bonaparte, the president of the Second Republic at the time and nephew of Napoleon I, staged a coup. He granted himself dictatorial powers and established the French Second Empire. According to the archives work of Margadant (1979), 100,000 men from 900 communes participated in protests against the coup. 70,000 from 775 communes mobilized in arms against the government, and 27,000 in 270 communes participated in violent clashes against the army. This event still remains the largest uprising in the history of the French provinces (*i.e.* outside of Paris). Figure 2 presents the data retrieved by Margadant (1979), with information on the location, nature, and size of insurgency events in December 1851. Unsurprisingly, most of them occurred in the southeastern part of France, which is the region where *Montagnard* clubs and secret societies were particularly active. Margadant (1979) underlines that the main determinant of participation in the insurrection was the politicization through *Montagnard* clubs as almost no region without such organizations participated in the insurrection.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Generally, the political leadership was located in urban centers. It delegated to small committees or local branches, formed by clubs and activists in rural areas

He also adds that rebellious areas did not have different economic foundations or social compositions<sup>14</sup>.



Figure 2: 1851 insurgency events

Despite their relatively modern political structure, the surprise of the coup d'état caught the Republicans off guard, affording them insufficient time to adequately orchestrate the insurrection, resulting in its failure. Consequently, Republicans underwent the greatest political purge in France between the Reign of Terror (1793-1794) and the end of the Second World War. According to the archives work of Margadant (1979) and Devos (1992), 26,884 people were arrested. 21,000 of them were sentenced, of which 9,530 were deported (notably 239 of them were sent to the *Bagne* in French Guiana).

#### 2.3 Savoy and Nice and the return to France

In the meantime, the Duchy of Savoy and the Nice County were part of the Piedmont-Sardinia Kingdom. The latter has also experienced revolutionary events, but mostly in the context of Italy's unification, such as the first Italian War of Independence in 1848 (*i.e.* the *Risorgimento*). Since the two regions were not culturally close with Piedmont, the Italian insurgency events did not have great echos in Savoy and Nice,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>More precisely, similar to areas that did not experience rebellion, rebellious regions witnessed a rise in agricultural output, growth in industrial activities, and could be viewed as semi-urban.

as the many declaration of Savoy deputies in the Torino assembly can suggest<sup>15</sup>. As for the politicization of the populations of Savoy and Nice, it mainly concerned the political entity that the territory should adopt: joining France, Italy, Switzerland or even becoming independent (Milbach, 2008; Courrière, 2019). Consequently, and unlike their French fellows, Republican politicians had less echo in these regions<sup>16</sup>, did not organize in secret clubs, and did not face political repression.

In 1860, Savoy and Nice went back to France in an exogenous manner. Victor-Emmanuel II, King of Italy and Duke of Savoy, gave the two regions back in exchange for France's help during Italy's war against the Austrian Empire in Lombardy. A plebiscite was organized and the population was asked if they wanted to join the French Empire. In Savoy, out of 130,839 voters, 130,533 voted yes. In Nice, 25,743 over 25,933 voted yes (Ménabréa, 2009; Varaschin, 2009). This abnormally high proportion of "yes" demonstrates the undemocratic nature of the vote. The cession of Savoy and Nice had in fact already been officially enacted in the Treaty of Turin signed a few weeks earlier, with the French army already present in the territory before the vote. The vote also lacked an alternative choice: staying in Italy, joining Switzerland, or becoming independent was not an option. And as noted by Baud and Binz (1985), the influence of the parish priests was determinant, directing the vote of religious and less-educated populations towards the yes side<sup>17</sup>.

In summary, Savoy and Nice exogenously changed political entities between 1815 and 1860. Consequently, these territories followed distinct historical paths notably marked by different politicization and an absence of exposure to political repression.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>"A high and powerful barrier separates Savoy from Italy, its customs, its habits, its language, its trade do not assign it any place in the great Italian family which must be constituted one day" "Une haute et puissante barrière sépare la Savoie et l'Italie, ses mœurs, ses habitudes, sa langue, son commerce ne lui assignent aucune place dans la grande famille italienne qui doit se constituer un jour" Pantaléon Costa de Beauregard; "If the war of Independence is popular in Piedmont, it is not in Savoy. You fight for your independence and your nationality: but we, why do we fight?" "Si la guerre de l'Indépendance est populaire en Piémont, elle ne l'est pas en Savoie. Vous combattez pour votre indépendance et votre nationalité : mais nous, pourquoi combattons-nous ?" Gustave de Martinel; "Your cause is not ours" "Votre cause n'est pas la nôtre" Charles Dufayard (sources: (Avezou, 1939; Dufayard, 1914)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>although the border was not totally impervious to the circulation of political ideas, as witnessed by the protests in Chambéry in 1848 (Milbach, 2008)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> "Si les six cents curés savoyards eussent fait opposition à l'annexion, la presque unanimité eût été en sens inverse" "If the six hundred Savoyard parish priests had opposed annexation, the almost unanimous decision would have been in the opposite direction." (Source: Baud and Binz (1985))

# **3** Empirical strategy and Data

## 3.1 Data

The sample considered for this study is composed of nine departments, more precisely Jura, Ain, Haute-Savoie, Savoie, Isère, Hautes-Alpes, Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, Alpes-Maritimes, and Var. For the main analyses, I focus on the smallest administrative units, which is the municipality (communes) level. Overall, there are 2,685 communes in the sample. Geographic boundary data are retrieved from GADM shapefiles (the Database of Global Administrative Areas).

In order to estimate the impact of politicization and political repression, electoral outcomes for the legislative election of 1871 (i.e. the first post-treatment-free election) are retrieved. To the best of my knowledge, no data is accessible on commune-level election results during the Third Republic (1870-1940). Consequently, I collected commune-level election records from French National Archives<sup>18</sup>.

In order to test for the long-run persistence, electoral results such as the vote for left and right-wing candidates or abstention during both presidential and legislative elections are retrieved from the French ministry of the interior<sup>19</sup>. The latter are available at the commune level, but unfortunately only for recent elections. The 1995 presidential election and 1997 legislative election were the first ones for which the ministry of the interior published commune-level results<sup>20</sup>. Consequently, there is information for commune-level electoral results for the presidential elections of 1995, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017, and 2022; and legislative elections of 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017, and 2022<sup>21</sup>.

## 3.2 Empirical strategy

In order to test the effect of different historic trajectories on electoral outcomes, I resort to a spatial regression discontinuity design, illustrated in Figure 3. More precisely, the goal is to estimate whether the early 19th-century politicization and 1851 political repression impacted both 1871 and long-run election results for homogeneous municipalities along the Savoy and Nice border. The geographical discontinuity design uses the following estimation:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Documents are accessible at the Archives Nationales de France in Pierrefitte-sur-Seine.Document number: C//3517-C//3564,C//3566-C//3606.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/pages/donnees-des-elections/

 $<sup>^{20}</sup>$ Using the 2017 commune structure. Results at the polling station level in 2022 were used to reconstitute results at the 2017 commune level for communes that merged between 2017 and 2022.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Older election results from the entire Fith Republic (1958 to nowadays) were collected by Sciences Po, but at the legislative district, which does not allow for the preferred empirical strategy.



Figure 3: 1815-1860 border - 15km bandwidth

 $Y_{m,t} = \alpha + \beta Treatment_m + [\lambda 1D_m + \lambda 2(D*Treat)_m + \lambda 3D_m^2 + \lambda 4(D^2*Treat)_m] + \theta X_m + \phi_t + \varepsilon_{m,t} + \delta X_m + \delta X_$ 

 $Y_{m,t}$  is the electoral outcome for municipality m during an election t. It can be the vote share in percent for left, far-left, moderate-left, right, far-right, or moderate-right candidates during a given presidential or legislative election.  $Treatment_m$  is the variable of interest and corresponds to a binary variable taking the value 1 if a given municipality m was located in France between 1815 and 1860. As suggested by Gelman and Imbens (2019), since the effect might differ based on proximity to the border, the distance between the 1815-1860 border and the municipality's chief town is included (retrieved from French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) statistics), as well as an interaction between the distance and the treatment, and second-degree polynomial

interactions. In order to account for commune-level particularities that can explain a tendency to vote for a particular political color, a vector X of time-invariant municipalitylevel controls is included. First, as Chambru et al. (2021) underlined, proximity to the department's prefecture was an important determinant for economic development in the 19th century (*i.e.* potentially a determinant of current voting behavior). Consequently, distances between a given municipality chief town and department prefectures or other large cities are included<sup>22</sup>. Second, as suggested by Dell (2010), in order to capture other unobserved time-invariant commune-level characteristics, I include the interaction between a given municipality chief town's latitude and longitude. Third, as in Dehdari and Gehring (2022), X comprises border-segment fixed effects, which allows comparison between treated and control municipalities that are geographically close. Finally, in order to take into account one election's particularity, an election fixed effect  $\phi$  is added<sup>23</sup>. Standard errors are clustered thanks to Conley (2010) spatial standard errors, with a radius of 10km in order to account for neighboring municipalities' spillovers<sup>24</sup>. On average, there are 22 municipalities per cluster.

The 1815-1860 frontier partially follows the current departmental boundaries<sup>25</sup>. In fact, the 1815-1860 border, which was used to draw the borders of today's departments, is the result of centuries of history and has been traced through wars, treaties, alliances, and exchanges of territory (summarized in Table A1). It may raise concerns about the exogeneity of this border. But as suggested by the map of Boula De Mareüil et al. (2017), the 1815-1860 border does not mark the division between different linguistic areas<sup>26</sup>. In fact, both sides of the Duchy of Savoy frontier were speaking Franco-Provencal dialects; and both sides of the Nice County border were speaking Langue d'Oc dialects. The 1815-1860 border also does not translate to any religious frontier, as both sides are mostly catholic and have a similar number of Protestant churches. In summary, in spite of the fact that the 1815-1860 border follows the line of the current departments and stems from previous historic events, it does not represent any sort of major cultural division, since the inhabitants on each side of the border speak similar languages and practice the same religion. As Figure A3 suggests, the frontier mostly follows geographic features such as the Rhône River between Haute-Savoie and Ain, the Guiers River between Isère and Savoie, the Var and Estéron rivers in the Alpes-Maritimes; or such as mountain ridges like the Massif des Cerces separating the Hautes-Alpes and Savoie. Considering

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Precisely, distances to Annecy, Bourg-en-Bresse, Chambéry, Gap, Digne-les-Bains, Geneva, Grenoble, Lons-le-Saunier, Lyon, Marseille, Nice, Toulon, Torino, and Genoa are included.

 $<sup>^{23}</sup>$ Except on the analysis of the 1871 election since it concerns only one election.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Regressions were run thanks to Colella et al. (2019) Stata package.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Only partially, the south border of the Nice country does not follow the department boundary of the Alpes-Maritimes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Source: https://atlas.limsi.fr/

the absence of cultural differentiation and its mostly geographic features, the 1815-1860 border can be considered exogenous.

#### 3.3 Discontinuities

Only the communes whose chief town is located within a 15 km band along the 1815-1860 border are taken into account in this specification since this threshold is close to the estimated optimal bandwidth (Calonico et al., 2014)<sup>27</sup> and allows for comparing communes that are homogeneous in characteristics. One first needs to ensure that communes are indeed similar in terms of pre and post-treatment characteristics that can act as confounding factors.

#### 3.3.1 Pre-treatment characteristics

Figure 4 presents discontinuities for geographic characteristics that can be determinants of political preferences. More precisely, the above-presented empirical strategy is used with various geographic parameters as dependent variables. As Nunn and Qian (2011) and Alesina et al. (2011) suggested, soil suitability for certain crops and early usage of the plow are determinants of long-run economic development and fertility preferences, which can affect political preferences. In addition, Nunn and Puga (2012) and Gooch (2019) found that rough terrain protected respectively remote African and Chinese areas from slavers raids and political repressions during the Great Leap Forward. One can extrapolate these results by suggesting that rough terrain may have protected some areas from 1851 political repression. Finally, Siegfried (1913) suggested that soil composition impacted long-run political preferences in the French department of Vendée. More precisely, he found that limestone soil leads to smaller farms and denser villages, which consequently reduces the influence of the church, hence leading to a less conservative vote.

Based on these findings, I test for discontinuities in soil suitability for wheat, barley, and potato (FAO/GAEZ), elevation and terrain ruggedness (CGIAR-SRTM), the estimated share of crops and grazing land in 1800 (History database of the Global Environment, Klein Goldewijk et al. (2011)), and the share of limestone soil per commune (BRGM, *Bureau de recherches géologiques et minières*)<sup>28</sup>. From the results presented in Figure 4, it seems that both treated and controls are not significantly different in terms of geographic characteristics, except for the estimated share of cropland per commune

 $<sup>^{27}</sup>$  Thanks to the rdbwselect Stata command, the optimal bandwidth was estimated to 18.24km and 14.5km for respectively presidential and legislative electoral outcomes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>The pixel resolution is 6x9km for FAO/GAEZ, 90m for CGIAR-SRTM, 6x9km for HYDE, and 25x50m for BRGM. Given the relatively low resolution, results for soil suitability and land use in 1800 should be taken with caution

in 1800, as the treated communes (*i.e.* those who were in France between 1815 and 1860) would have significantly more land dedicated to crops. However, based on the current and more precise land cover data (Global Land Cover), the share of cropland is not significantly different between treated and control communes. Additionally, thanks to French census data from 1861, 1866, and 1872 at the arrondissement level<sup>29</sup>, treated and controls had a similar share of farmers. The share of cropland in 1800 is nonetheless added as a control in the robustness checks.



Figure 4: Pre-treatment - Geographic characteristics

*Notes*: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, communelevel controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 561.

Testing for potential discontinuities on pre-treatment political preferences is also essential. One may worry that I simply capture already pre-existing differences in political preferences, potentially stemming from the several changes of political entities that Savoy and Nice have known throughout their history. In fact, the perception of monarchy in Savoy and Nice might have varied among the population since the Piedmont Sardinia Kingdom, which previously governed these territories, was regarded as a relatively enlightened political system. Consequently, the population along the border in Savoy and Nice could potentially harbor less aversion to monarchy, resulting in a diminished inclination towards left-leaning and Republican ideologies. As the pre-treatment period was before 1815, carrying out these tests is not an easy task, since there were

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Administrative level smaller than department but larger than communes.

very few universal suffrage elections at that time. The only election to have occurred before 1815 under universal suffrage was the legislative election of 1792. But turnout was very low and close to censal suffrage levels<sup>30</sup>. One can hardly consider these votes as representative of the population's opinion. Consequently, I resort to the Chambru and Maneuvrier-Hervieu (2022) Historical Social Conflict Database as a proxy for pretreatment political preferences. The latter is a dataset constituted from archival sources and provides information on social conflicts that occurred in France between the 12th and 19th centuries. It contains highly detailed information, such as the date and precise location of the conflict, as well as the estimated number of people involved and the type of social conflict. Figure A4 shows a map of the social conflicts between 1700 and 1789 in the area, and Table A2 presents descriptive statistics for social conflict variables in the sample.



Figure 5: Pre-treatment - Political characteristics

*Notes*: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, communelevel controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 561.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>According to Dupuy (2014), turnout was between 10 and 11% only

Figure 5 displays coefficients for the treatment variable. I focus solely on social conflicts that occurred between 1700 and 1789, as they are more likely to capture contemporary political opinions, especially with the events related to the French Revolution. Treated and control communes do not seem to differ significantly in terms of social conflict in the 18th century. Further analyses are conducted by types of conflicts. Once again, no side experienced significantly more conflicts of any kind, which is reassuring, especially for conflicts against dominant groups.

In addition, based on the French National Assembly dataset, I compare the share of left-wing representatives by departments across three regimes: the National Convention (1792-1795), the Council of Five Hundred (1795-1799), and the Napoleonic Era (1800-1814)<sup>31</sup>. Results in Table A3 indicate that treated departments did not elect significantly more left-wing representatives.

Finally, based on the work of Vovelle (2002), the presence of refractory priests<sup>32</sup> during the French Revolution turned their parishioners towards political conservatism. Based on data retrieved from Vovelle (2002) and Biard et al. (2015), Figure A5 presents the share of refractory priests per department. It seems that both treated and control areas had a high rate of *Jureur* priests<sup>33</sup>, but no side seems to experience a higher prevalence. Consequently, despite changes in political entities before 1815, no side was more revolutionary than the other. In other words, treated and control communes did not differ in terms of pre-treatment political opinions.

## 3.3.2 Post-treatment characteristics

One must ensure that control areas did not have different economic and cultural paths between 1815 and 1860, which could explain future discontinuities in terms of electoral outcomes. Using census data from 1861 at the arrondissement level (*i.e.* one year after Savoy and Nice return in France), results in Figure A6 suggest that treated and control areas have homogeneous characteristics even after 45 years of different administrations. They have a similar population in terms of nationalities (even though treated may have significantly fewer Swiss), religion, and socio-economic structure.

But many things could have happened between 1860 and 1995 (the first year for which commune-level recent election results are available) that might have influenced political preferences on both sides of the border in distinct ways.

First, both sides may have experienced different paths in terms of early migration to

 $<sup>^{31}</sup>$ The notion of the political left was not clearly established at the time. I based my classification on Julliard (2014). Consequently, *Montagnard* and moderate are considered as the most left-wing political offer during the National Convention, the Council of Five Hundred, and the Napoleonic Era

 $<sup>^{32}</sup>$ Priest who had refused to take the oath to the civil constitution during the French Revolution.

 $<sup>^{33}\</sup>mathrm{Priests}$  who agreed to take the oath to the civil constitution.

large cities, such as Paris. And according to Barsbai et al. (2017), migrants can affect stayers' political preferences. Consequently, if the treated side migrated more to Paris, it may explain its tendency to vote more for left-wing candidates. As done by Daudin et al. (2019), I constructed the number of migrants to Paris by arrondissement, for each decade between 1860 and 1900. The latter was constructed thanks to the TRA survey (Bourdieu et al., 2014) and the French census. TRA survey, also known as the Enquêtes de 3,000 familles, presents information on the birth, marriage, and death place of roughly 25,000 individuals whose name starts with the letters "TRA". From this information, the share of migrants to Paris per arrondissement is built and matched with the population information of the French census in order to have the estimated number of migrants to Paris per arrondissement. While the TRA survey's representativeness is limited when examined at the arrondissement level and might exhibit selection bias for control areas, as people born in Savoy and Nice before 1860 are not included since these territories were not part of France, it is the most detailed geographic data available concerning early migration to Paris. I also used the department-name census from the INSEE in order to generate the occurrence of typically local names from the treated department in overall Parisian birth for each decade between 1890 and 2000.

Table A4 presents the discontinuity results for three measures of migration to Paris. Regarding the TRA survey and migration to Paris as the occurrence of local names in Paris between 1890 and 1910, there should be no significant differences between treated and control arrondissements in terms of migration to Paris during the 19th century. When the occurrence of local names in Paris between 1890 and 2000 is considered, the treated side would have migrated less. This result is not such a great concern since this should have increased the left vote share for control communes stayers (based on the findings of Barsbai et al. (2017)), yet the main finding of this paper suggests that treated communes vote significantly more for left-wing candidates.

One may also worry that a self-selected migration based on political criteria occurred from control to treated areas after the return of Savoy and Nice to France in 1860, potentially increasing the number of left-wing voters in treated areas. According to French census data, the evolution of the population in both treated and control departments remained stable after 1860 (Figure A7).

Second, treated and control communes were potentially hit differently by the First and Second World Wars. One side may have suffered more from the Allied bombing or may have had more casualties, potentially changing attitudes toward politicians (Adena et al., 2021). Using the THOR (Theater History of Operations), the *Mémoire des Hommes* French Ministry of Army databases and The Morts Pour la France database (Gay and Grosjean, 2023) on respectively allied bombing, military and civil loss during the Second World War, and military loss during the First World War, results in Figure A8 suggest that no side went through tougher conditions during World Wars.

Finally, other unobserved events may have potentially impacted differently treated and control communes, translating into different socio-economic current characteristics. According to electoral sociology literature (Lewis-Beck, 1983; Gaxie, 1989; Gonthier, 2021), income and socio-professional category are relevant determinants of French voters' electoral behavior. Consequently, using data from the INSEE, I test whether treated communes had a significantly different population, immigration, social composition, employment, public goods distribution, income, wealth, security, and transport in 2017. According to the results presented in Figure 6, communes composing the sample are homogeneous in characteristics. They notably have a similar share of young people, share of workers, and median/mean income.

In summary, treated and control communes are homogeneous in pre and post-treatment characteristics. More precisely, they did not have different political preferences before the treatment, they have similar geographic features, migration patterns, Second World War experience, and current socio-economic characteristics. Consequently, one can safely attribute a discontinuity in electoral outcomes as the result of different historic trajectories.

# 4 Results

## 4.1 Republican Politicization's effects

## 4.1.1 First post-treatment election: 1871

One first needs to examine the impact of different historic trajectories, notably marked by different politicization, on the electoral outcomes during the first free election after treatment, *i.e.* the legislative election of 1871.

Table 1 presents the baseline results of the treatment's effect (*i.e.* to be in France between 1815 and 1860) on the commune-level election results for the 1871 legislative election. According to the work of Julliard (2014), Republicans were a heterogeneous political family during the end of the 19th century, that could be divided into two groups: moderate republicans (also named opportunists), willing to form alliances with moderate conservatives<sup>34</sup>; and radical Republicans, who held more socialist positions<sup>35</sup>. Consequently, votes for Republicans are divided into two subsamples: vote for moderate or radical Republicans<sup>36</sup>. Communes that were located in France between 1815 and 1860

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup>group that included as notable representatives Jules Ferry, Jules Grévy, Adolphe Thiers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup>Notable representatives: Léon Gambetta, Louis Blanc, Victor Hugo

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>Classification was made through group membership retrieved from the National Assembly website (https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/recherche)



## Figure 6: Post-treatment - INSEE statistics (2017)

*Notes*: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 561.

voted significantly more for radical Republican candidates (*i.e.* the ideological ancestors of the current left-wing) in the 1871 election. On average, radical Republican candidates

Dep. Var.:	Non	Republican					
$Vote_m$	Rep.	All	Moderate	Radical			
Treatment $_m$	-1.289 (3.053)	1.289 (3.053)	-14.823 (3.310)***	7.821 $(3.499)^{**}$			
N	326	326	326	326			
$R^2$	0.80	0.80	0.71	0.83			
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Election FE	No	No	No	No			

Table 1: Treatment on 1871 legislative election results - Absolute effect

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

had 7.8 additional percentage points in the treated municipalities $^{37}$ .

In summary, different historical paths involving different politicization had a relatively short-run impact, since the treated side who was politicized through Republican clubs voted significantly more for radical Republican candidates in the 1871 legislative election.

#### 4.1.2 Persistence of the effect

One can now verify whether the previously observed pattern has been maintained throughout history. Table 2 presents the baseline results of the treatment's effect on the commune-level first-round presidential election results<sup>38</sup>. Communes that were located in France between 1815 and 1860 voted significantly more for left-wing candidates between 1995 and 2022. On average, left-wing candidates had 1.3 additional percentage points in the treated municipalities. This result seems to be mainly driven by moderate left-wing candidates (*i.e.* mostly the *Parti Socialiste*)<sup>39</sup>.

Table 3 presents the baseline results for commune-level first-round legislative election

 $<sup>^{37}</sup>$ The first post-treatment vote was a Napoleonic plebiscite in 1870. Even though it cannot be considered a free election, I also collected electoral-district-level results through newspaper archives. Results seem to depict greater opposition to the Empire on the treated side, which can be interpreted as a Republican electoral behavior (Table A5, Lacroix (2018))

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>Discontinuity graphs presenting non-linear correlations for the same electoral outcomes are in Figure A9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>Note that the coefficients between right and left are not symmetrical, indicating that the sum of votes between left and right does not reach 100%. This is explained by the fact that some candidates have been classified as neither right nor left, such as self-defined centrists like François Bayrou or the rather unclassifiable Jacques Cheminade.

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.334 (0.594)**	$0.384 \\ (0.450)$	0.920 $(0.412)^{**}$	-0.391 (0.587)	-0.364 (0.553)	-0.027 (0.598)	$0.485 \\ (0.443)$
N	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	$3,\!335$	3,335
$R^2$	0.54	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.69	0.54	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 2: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Absolute effect

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

results<sup>40</sup>. The trends are more pronounced as treated-side communes significantly voted more for left-wing and less for right-wing candidates between 1997 and 2022. On average, left-wing candidates had 2.8 additional percentage points in the treated municipalities, as right-wing candidates had 3.7 percentage points less. Results are both driven by moderate left and right-wing candidates.

Table 3: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Absolute effect

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.803 $(1.311)^{**}$	0.001 (0.644)	2.802 (1.395)**	-3.725 $(1.680)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.566 \\ (0.721) \end{array}$	-4.291 (1.667)**	-0.602 (0.568)
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366
$R^2$	0.56	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.70	0.52	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Absolute-level results are however incomplete, as one additional percentage point can be much or negligible regarding the context of an election. Consequently, as in Ochsner and Roesel (2020), relative share results are presented in Tables A6 and A7 in the appendix. The latter is the ratio between the absolute vote in a given commune

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup>Discontinuity graphs presenting non-linear correlations are in Figure A10.

over the average vote in the overall sample. One can interpret the relative shares as the fraction of voters that can be attributed to the absolute effect of the discontinuity. The latter accounts for 6% of the average vote share for moderate left-wing candidates in first-round presidential elections and for more than 10% of the average vote share for moderate left and right-wing candidates in first-round legislative elections.

Tables A8 and A9 report absolute and relative results for the second round results. The intuition is the same for legislative elections as treated communes are voting significantly more for left-wing candidates. Results are not significant for presidential elections.

In summary, it seems that different historical trajectories and early politicization during the 19th century had an impact on a relatively short-run horizon, and still have an impact on current electoral outcomes, since communes that were in France between 1815 and 1860 are significantly voting more for left-wing candidates in both presidential and legislative elections. Dubious readers might still question whether these results are influenced by the numerous events that took place between 1871 and 1995. It is then necessary to examine the historical continuity in this result.

## 4.1.3 Historic continuity: electoral district level results

Many events potentially explaining this result could have taken place between 1871 and 1995. Consequently, the historical continuity of these results must be demonstrated in order to attribute this effect to the 1815-1860 discontinuity. One must verify if this result holds over time between 1871 and 1995. Doing so is however difficult since communes-level election results are available only since the 1995 presidential election. Electoral district-level results were retrieved by Sciences Po<sup>41</sup> for every election of the Fith Republic (from 1958 to nowadays). Thanks to the online newspaper archives of the *Biblihothèque Nationale de France* (Gallica), election results at the electoral district level for legislative election from 1876 to 1958 were retrieved<sup>42</sup>. More precisely, election reports from the daily newspapers *L'Humanité*, *Le Figaro*, *La Croix*, *Le Petit Journal*, *Le Petit Parisien* and *L'Echo de Paris* were cross-checked and collected in order to build this first-hand original historic database. Since the geographic unit is not anymore at the commune level but at the electoral district one, the following model is performed:

$$Y_{c,t} = \alpha + \beta Treatment_c + \phi_t + \varepsilon_{c,t}$$

 $Y_{m,t}$  is the electoral outcome for electoral district c during an election t. It can be the vote share in percent for left or right candidates during a given presidential or legislative election. Given the extensive time span of over a hundred years, the notion of political

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/pages/donnees-des-elections/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>Legislative election only, since all presidential elections were available in the Sciences Po database.

left or right was an evolving concept. For instance, the *Parti Radical* was the most left political offer in the 1870s and then allied with center-right parties in the 1930s. Therefore, I have based my left-right classification on the works of Julliard (2014) and Richard (2017). *Treatment<sub>m</sub>* is a dummy taking the value 1 if a given electoral district c was located in France between 1815 and 1860. An election fixed effect  $\phi$  is included in order to account for one election's particularity. Standard errors are clustered at the electoral district level.

Even though this specification is imperfect, as it compares a wider population that is likely not homogeneous in terms of characteristics, it can provide insight into the historical continuity of the effect. Specifically, one must check whether older elections show similar results to contemporary elections (1995-2022). Figure 7 and 8 display the historical trend for respectively presidential and legislative elections. Tables A10, A11, A12, and A13 present the pooled presidential and legislative election results at the electoral-district level, notably by carrying-out two subsamples: ancient election (prior to 1995, *i.e.* elections for which there is no commune-level information) and contemporary elections (after 1995). It seems that both the 1871 and contemporary elections were not an exception, and the side that was in France between 1815 and 1860 experienced a higher vote share for left-wing candidates over the entire period. One can safely assume that such electoral behavior can also be observed at the commune level for older elections.





*Notes*: Coefficients estimated with an election fixed effect, with spatial standard errors clustered at the electoral district level. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Observations: 26 from 1965 to 1981, 34 from 1988 to 2007, and 37 from 2012 to 2022





Notes: Coefficients estimated with an election fixed effect, with spatial standard errors clustered at the electoral district level. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Observations: 34 from 1876 to 1936, 46 from 1958 to 1986, and 67 from 1988 to 2022. There are no coefficients during the Fourth Republic (1946-1958), because legislative election results were published at the department level.

#### 4.2 External validity

As the 1815-1860 frontier partially follows administrative boundaries, dubious readers may think the previous results simply show the effect of different administrations or the consequences of close proximity to neighboring countries. Consequently, the communelevel model is used on other department borders that are close to frontiers (figure A11). As results in Tables A14 and A15 suggest, both north and south placebo frontiers do not translate discontinuities<sup>43</sup>. It is unlikely that baseline results simply capture an administrative or proximity to neighboring countries' effect.

In order to verify whether this boundary is the one determining the discontinuity, other placebo frontiers were tested. More precisely, the 1815-1860 frontier has been moved 15km west and east. Results in Tables A16 and A17 are reassuring about the importance of the 1815-1860 frontier since the west and east placebos do not translate into significant differences in terms of voting.

There might also be concerns that either the northern or the southern part of the border drives entirely the results. Results in Table A18, A19, A20, and A21 suggest the effect on presidential election results are driven by the northern part, whereas the southern part of the border explains the effect on legislative election outcomes.

One may also worry about discontinuities for the estimated share of cropland in 1800 and population density (*i.e.* the only two variables with a significant difference between

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup>I didn't make a placebo border for the east side, as it would have captured various effects linked to Alsace's history, as depicted by Dehdari and Gehring (2022).

the treatment and control groups), and about the role of income as a major determinant of voting behavior. These variables were consequently added to the model, and Tables A22 and A23 show that the results remain unchanged.

The confounding aspect of migration can also be of concern, especially if there was self-selected migration between treatment and control communes based on political criteria. In order to account for this issue, population growth per commune between 1876 and 1911 (INSEE) was added, notably in order to account for early migration. Results reported in Tables A24 and A25 indicate that controlling for population growth does not change the main findings.

Alternative dependent variables also depict a similar pattern for the treated side. Using Sciences Po's Inter-regional survey of political phenomena (CDSP) with selfpositioning on the left-right scale for 14,637 individuals from the 9 departments considered between 1985 and 2004, and the data from Martelli (2010) on French Communist Party members by departments between 1913 and 2009, both sources validate that treated departments lean more toward the political left. They have significantly more people who self-declare as left-wing, as being close to a left-wing party, and more Communist Party members (Table A26).

Baseline results also remain robust to alternative definitions of left and right-wing candidates<sup>44</sup> (Tables A27 and A28), alternative cluster at the canton level (Tables A29 and A30), alternative 5km and 15km spatial clusters (Tables A31, A32, A33, and A34), alternative 10, 20, 25, and 30km bandwidth (Tables A35, A36, A37, A38, A39, A40, A41, and A42), optimal bandwidth (Tables A43 and A44), and are not driven by one commune in particular (Figures A12 and A13) or by commune that merged between 1995 and 2017<sup>45</sup> (Table A45 and A46).

## 4.3 Repression against Republicans in 1851

So far, the results presented above mostly display a long-run impact of different historic trajectories. This could be explained by several causes, such as the different politicization processes on each side of the border that occurred at the beginning of the 19th century. The political repression of 1851, which occurred only on the French side of the border, may have played a role in this outcome. Even if the discontinuity is probably not entirely due to the 1851 events, one can try to understand how this political repression inter-played with the politicization made earlier in the 19th century. Did it reinforce the preference for left-wing, as would suggest the findings of Nugent (2020); or did it mitigate it, as shown by Young (2019)?

 $<sup>^{44}</sup>$  Jean-Luc Mélenchon as moderate left, centrists as moderate right

 $<sup>^{45}\</sup>mathrm{which}$  concerns 2.5% of the communes in the sample

"Administrative repression created martyrs to the republican cause and strengthened the solidarity of local populations against the state". In order to test the intuition of Margadant (1979), I consider the role of repression on the preference for left-wing candidates in the treated side by adding the size of 1851 repression by communes in the model.





Based on the archive work of Devos (1992), who collected the pension requests of the 1851 repression's victims following the law of reparation of 1881<sup>46</sup>. The latter contains information about the name of the person who was repressed, the place and date of birth, as well as the place where the person was in 1851 and his or her occupation. The number of pension claims by communes is going to be the measure of political

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup>The national reparation law voted by Republicans when they came to power in 1881 gave the opportunity for 1851 political repression victims or their family to be financially compensated. The request had to be made to the prefecture, then a commission approved or rejected the request.

repression. This measure could be subject to selection bias since these data may not measure repression exhaustively. For example, if a young man was repressed in 1851, but is no longer alive or in France, and has no parents or descendants who made the claim at the prefecture in 1881, this person will not appear in the data. However, according to Margadant's archive work, the insurgents were not particularly younger than the rest of the population. And even if a selection bias persists, it would only contribute to underestimating our effect. Regarding Figure 9, the political repression situation in 1851 was different between the Savoy Duchy frontier in the north and the Nice County in the south. Since the Republican insurgency mostly took place in the southern part, political repression was consequently tougher in this area. Some departments took advantage of this situation to repress locally known Republican notables, although there were no major insurrectionary events. Figure A14 shows the same information but with a binary equal to 1 if at least one individual was repressed in the commune. Table A47 shows political repression statistics for communes within the 15km bandwidth.

Results when adding the number of repressed per communes in the model are shown in Tables 4 and  $5^{47}$ . On average, a repressed commune on the treated side would tend to have a significantly smaller preference for left-wing candidates, hence validating Young (2019) fear hypothesis. Communes subjected to repression on the treated side would also exhibit a significantly higher abstention rate. Targeted repression against Republicans would have diminished preference for the left, but not enough in order to reverse the initial preference for left-wing candidates. For instance, a commune in the Ain department named Belley counted 4 citizens repressed in 1851. On average, this commune would vote 2.357% more for left-wing candidates in the legislative elections, which is lower than their neighboring municipalities that have not experienced political repression, and vote on average 2.861% more for left-wing candidates. In other words, political repression could not change the initial preference brought by politicization.

Since Margadant (1979) suggest that *Montagnard* clubs were often organized as periurban networks, with the main branch in an urban center (like the chief town of a canton) and smaller branches in villages nearby, one can safely assume that citizens repressed in a given commune had a network of Republican companion in nearby municipalities. Consequently, one can consider the effect of 5km buffers around repressed communes, since the reprimanded citizen is probably close to people living within this radius. Tables A48 and A49 present the results with a 5km buffer around repressed communes. The intuition remains the same: On average, communes close to a repressed municipality

 $<sup>^{47}</sup>$ One may wonder why the *Repressed* variable does not interact with the treatment. It is simply because there was no repressed on the control side (*i.e.* the Savoy Duchy and the Nice County) since they were not in France during 1851. Therefore, an interaction term is equivalent to the *Repressed* variable.

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	$1.346 \\ (0.596)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.393 \\ (0.450) \end{array}$	$0.923 \\ (0.419)^{**}$	-0.400 (0.584)	-0.349 (0.552)	-0.051 (0.604)	$0.459 \\ (0.444)$
Repressed $m$	-0.025 (0.035)	-0.019 (0.027)	-0.006 (0.028)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.020 \\ (0.037) \end{array}$	-0.032 (0.036)	$0.052 \\ (0.045)$	$0.057 \\ (0.035)$
N	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335
$R^2$	0.54	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.69	0.54	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 4: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Number of repressed individuals by commune

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius

\* p < 0.10,\*\* p < 0.05,\*\*\* p < 0.010

Table 5: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Number of repressed individuals by commune

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.861 (1.311)**	$\begin{array}{c} 0.018 \\ (0.650) \end{array}$	2.843 $(1.400)^{**}$	-3.839 $(1.683)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.579 \\ (0.722) \end{array}$	$-4.418$ $(1.676)^{***}$	-0.650 (0.566)
Repressed $_m$	-0.126 $(0.056)^{**}$	-0.037 (0.027)	-0.090 $(0.052)^*$	$0.246 \ (0.096)^{**}$	-0.027 (0.041)	0.273 $(0.086)^{***}$	$0.103 \\ (0.048)^{**}$
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366
$R^2$	0.56	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.70	0.52	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

have a significantly smaller preference for left-wing candidates.

The intuition stays unchanged when considering a 10km radius around repressed communes (Tables A50 and A51), when using a dummy variable equal to one if at least one citizen was repressed in the commune (Tables A52 and A53), and when expressing the repression relative to the population (share of repressed citizen per thousand inhabitants, Tables A54 and A55). Despite the relatively different repression situation between North and South, results in Tables A56, A57, A58, and A59 suggest a similar effect between the northern and southern parts of the border.

These results illustrate the Young (2019) hypothesis since communes that have lived political repression against Republicans have a significantly lower preference for left-wing candidates in current elections, as compared to neighboring municipalities that did not suffer such repression. The targeted political repression against Republicans reduced the long-run preference for the left, but not to the point of reversing the initial preference brought by the different historic trajectories.

# 5 Channels

#### 5.1 How? Political dynasties and memories of the repression

The previous section highlighted the long-run effects of politicization and political repression on current electoral results. How this memory has been passed on from the 19th century to the present day? Existing literature might suggest that memories of politicization and repression have been transmitted through generations via parental socialization, thus modifying political demand on the treated side. It is also possible that repression has affected individuals whose descendants have risen to local elected positions (such as mayor), thus creating a political offer in which the personal memory of repression remains, hence influencing the electoral behavior of its administered citizens.

In order to test this hypothesis of a change in the political offer, I investigate repressed political dynasties in the treated communes with a definition similar to Lacroix et al. (2023): thanks to Devos (1992) archive works and the genealogy of French mayors<sup>48</sup>, I can match the names of repressed citizens and mayors between 1851 to nowadays. Repressed political dynasties would be defined here as mayors who share a family name with individuals who experienced repression in 1851 within a radius of 20 kilometers around the commune where these mayors are in office. Communes in green in Figure 10 had at least one mayor with potentially repressed ancestors in the department. Note that some communes on the control side appear in green since it is possible that repressed citizens migrated to the control side after the events. From this information, I built

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup>Mayors names were cross-checked between Francegenweb, geneawiki, and Wikipedia.

the relative length of repressed political dynasties per commune, defined as the share of years with a mayor with potentially repressed ancestors divided by the total number of years between 1851 and 2022. This measure is the preferred one since it accounts for heterogeneity in terms of repressed political dynasties. The effect may be different whether the commune had a "repressed" mayor for 6 or 50 years. This measure also enables considering the length of the political dynasties, which can be a sign of political conservatism in and of itself. Table A60 presents descriptive statistics for different measures of repressed political dynasties.





Tables 6 and 7 present results with an interaction between the treatment and the share of years with a mayor likely to have repressed ancestors. The attenuated preference for the left due to repression is likely to be driven by the local political offer since communes that potentially had repressed political dynasties have a significantly lower

preference for the left. Margin graphs in Figures A15 and A16 confirm that repressed political dynasties reduce the preference for the left.

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	$1.388 \\ (0.598)^{**}$	$0.425 \\ (0.456)$	$0.932 \ (0.416)^{**}$	-0.437 (0.583)	-0.319 (0.559)	-0.118 (0.604)	$0.483 \\ (0.445)$
Rel. Length $_{m}$	$0.122 \\ (0.051)^{**}$	$0.080 \\ (0.046)^*$	$0.040 \\ (0.020)^{**}$	-0.104 $(0.052)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.060 \\ (0.047) \end{array}$	-0.164 $(0.054)^{***}$	-0.020 (.)
Treatment $_m$ x Rel. Length $_m$	-0.239 $(0.064)^{***}$	-0.110 $(0.055)^{**}$	-0.127 $(0.034)^{***}$	$0.206 \\ (0.069)^{***}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \\ (0.056) \end{array}$	$0.177 \\ (0.075)^{**}$	0.087 $(0.033)^{***}$
$\frac{N}{R^2}$	$3,335 \\ 0.54$	$3,335 \\ 0.56$	$3,335 \\ 0.83$	$3,335 \\ 0.58$	$3,335 \\ 0.69$	$3,335 \\ 0.54$	$3,335 \\ 0.55$
Commune controls Border Segment FE Election FE	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes

Table 6: Presidential elections (1995-2022) - Interaction with relative number of years with mayor having the same name as repressed citizens 20km around

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Results are robust to alternative definitions of repressed-political dynasties, such as a binary variable if the commune had at least one mayor with potentially repressed ancestors (Tables A61 and A62), and with the total number of years with such mayor in office (Tables A63 and A64). In summary, the memory of the repression is likely to have been transmitted through repressed political dynasties, since communes where mayors have ancestors who experienced repression in 1851 have a significantly lower preference for the left.

# 5.2 How? Emigration of repressed citizens

As indicated in the introduction with the example of "Chacaille", the effect of repression may have persisted over time with the migration of citizens subjected to it. According to Margadant (1979), approximately 34% of individuals arrested in 1851 were transported. This massive enforced emigration, coupled with the voluntary exile of citizens fearing repression, could have mechanically led to a decline in the number of Republicans, hence impacting the network of left-wing activists for decades. The archive work of Devos (1992) allows exploring this emigration mechanism since it provides detailed information on the legal sanction applied to repressed individuals. It also includes if they were sent to locations like Algeria or Guiana, or if they chose to go into exile. From this data, the number of repressed citizens leaving the commune for either forced transportation

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.880 $(1.318)^{**}$	0.097 (0.678)	2.784 (1.394)**	-3.736 $(1.658)^{**}$	0.607 (0.720)	$-4.343$ $(1.642)^{***}$	-0.558 (0.568)
Rel. Length $_m$	$0.163 \\ (0.078)^{**}$	$0.171 \\ (0.093)^*$	-0.007 (0.051)	-0.030 (0.081)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.052 \\ (0.064) \end{array}$	-0.082 (0.091)	0.049 $(0.010)^{***}$
Treatment $_m$ x Rel. Length $_m$	-0.279 $(0.092)^{***}$	-0.171 $(0.090)^*$	-0.107 (0.076)	$0.077 \\ (0.110)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.041 \\ (0.081) \end{array}$	$0.036 \\ (0.130)$	$0.090 \\ (0.038)^{**}$
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366
$R^2$	0.56	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.70	0.52	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 7: Legislative elections (1997-2022) - Interaction with relative number of years with mayor having the same name as repressed citizens 20km around

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at  $10 \rm km$  radius

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

or exile is constructed. Table A65 presents descriptive statistics on emigration variables. Tables 8 and 9 present the model with the emigration variable included<sup>49</sup>:

On average, communes with repressed citizens who emigrated have a significantly smaller preference for left-wing candidates. Once again, the effect is not large enough to reverse the initial preference for the left. For example, 1 citizen emigrated in 1851 and left the commune of Jausiers in the Alpes-de-Haute-Provence department. On average, this municipality would vote 2.479% more for left-wing candidates during the legislative elections, which is lower than neighboring communes that had no documented emigration during 1851's repression. One may also note the larger coefficient for the emigration variable as compared to the repression one in Table 5, hence suggesting that mechanical reduction in the number of Republican activists played an important role in the repression's persistent effect on electoral outcomes.

#### 5.3 Why? Lack of population mixing

Previous sections presented the long-run effects of politicization and political repression, and how the effect of the repression was transmitted. One may now ask what explains this persistent difference between treated and control communes, despite 150 years of shared history. The lack of population mixing can be a potential explanation for such lasting differences in political beliefs. Opinions can be expected to be firmly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup>Unlike analyses of repressed-political dynasties, the emigration variable does not interact since there were no repressed citizens on the control side.

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.327 $(0.595)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.382\\ (0.450) \end{array}$	$0.915 \ (0.418)^{**}$	-0.388 (0.583)	-0.362 (0.552)	-0.026 (0.602)	$0.481 \\ (0.444)$
Emigration $_m$	$0.117 \\ (0.141)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.026 \\ (0.121) \end{array}$	$0.094 \\ (0.107)$	-0.046 (0.142)	-0.039 (0.147)	-0.007 (0.190)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.076 \ (0.153) \end{array}$
N	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335
$R^2$	0.54	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.69	0.54	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 8: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Interaction with number of repressed who emigrated

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

\* p < 0.10,\*\* p < 0.05,\*\*\* p < 0.010

Table 9: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Interaction with number of repressed who emigrated

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.824 (1.304)**	$0.002 \\ (0.654)$	2.822 (1.395)**	-3.748 $(1.651)^{**}$	$0.570 \\ (0.716)$	-4.318 $(1.641)^{***}$	-0.639 (0.572)
Emigration $_m$	-0.345 $(0.195)^*$	-0.009 (0.066)	-0.336 $(0.194)^*$	$0.384 \ (0.175)^{**}$	-0.067 (0.145)	0.451 $(0.151)^{***}$	0.614 $(0.203)^{***}$
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366
$R^2$	0.56	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.70	0.52	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

\* p < 0.10,\*\* p < 0.05,\*\*\* p < 0.010

anchored if people have little contact with others from different regions. For instance, individuals from control communes will hardly change their opinions if they never encounter people from treated communes. In such cases, parental socialization will play a more important role in the construction of political beliefs, which ease the persistence of the previously established discontinuity across generations (Peisakhin, 2013). On the contrary, as suggested in Daudin et al. (2019) and Barsbai et al. (2017), contact with different populations can shape preferences, and individuals living in control communes can change their opinions if they meet people from the treated area. Using French academic division<sup>50</sup> and employment areas<sup>51</sup> can be a way to verify the role of population mixing in persistence or convergence.

More precisely, the sample can be divided into two: treated and control communes that are located in the same academy or employment zone, versus communes that are located in different ones. People from the first sample are expected to mix more since they are very likely to study in the same universities and/or work in the same areas. Figure A17 and A18 respectively represent the academic division and employment zones in southeastern France.

Dep. Var.:	Same academia		Different	academia
$Vote_{m,t}$	Left	Right	Left	Right
Treatment $_m$	-0.326 (0.807)	1.274 (0.824)	2.083 $(0.735)^{***}$	$-1.434$ $(0.611)^{**}$
N	2,099	2,099	1,797	1,797
$R^2$	0.63	0.56	0.58	0.46
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 10: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Subsamples with academic division

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Tables 10 and 11 present presidential and legislative election discontinuities for both samples according to academic division. Most of the time, differences in electoral results are driven by communes that are not in the same academy (except for the legislative first round). The same intuition is verified in the presidential and legislative second rounds

 $<sup>^{50}</sup>$ An academy is an administrative district of the French Ministry of Education, responsible for supervising education within its geographic area

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup>As defined by the INSEE, an employment zone is a geographic area within which most people work.

Dep. Var.:	Same aca	demia	Different academia		
$Vote_{m,t}$	Left	Right	Left	Right	
Treatment $_m$	4.197 $(1.312)^{***}$	-0.858 (2.071)	0.701 (2.222)	-6.220 (2.585)**	
N	1,812	1,812	1,554	1,554	
$R^2$	0.58	0.37	0.58	0.49	
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Table 11: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Subsamples with a cademic division

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

(Tables A66 and A67). More precisely, treated and control communes whose inhabitants are likely to mix during higher education do not significantly vote differently from one another. On the opposite, treated and control communes who are less likely to mix during higher education vote differently across the 1815-1860 border.

Table 12: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Subsamples with employment zone

Dep. Var.:	Same	zone	Different zone		
$Vote_{m,t}$	Left Right		Left	Right	
Treatment $_m$	$1.395 \\ (0.615)^{**}$	-0.750 (0.546)	3.952 (1.354)***	-3.075 $(1.420)^{**}$	
N	1,936	1,936	1,960	1,960	
$R^2$	0.62	0.49	0.62	0.54	
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Tables 12 and 13 outline election discontinuities based on employment zone samples. Once again, most of the differences in electoral results stem from communes where individuals are working in different employment zones (except for the legislative first

Dep. Var.:	Same zone		Different zone	
$Vote_{m,t}$	Left	Right	Left	Right
Treatment $_m$	$0.739 \\ (1.778)$	$-4.369$ $(1.992)^{**}$	7.925 $(2.177)^{***}$	-3.634 (3.734)
N	1,674	1,674	1,692	1,692
$R^2$	0.51	0.52	0.61	0.37
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 13: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Subsamples with employment zone

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

round). Similar results can be verified with second rounds (Tables A68 and A69). In other words, treated and control communes whose inhabitants are working in the same zone do not vote differently from each other. And treated communes whose inhabitants do not work with control people are driving the discontinuity.

In summary, the persistent effects of this discontinuity on electoral results can be explained by the lack of population mixing during higher education and/or at work.

# 6 Conclusion

Based on the results of these spatial discontinuity design regressions, different historic trajectories during a century when contemporary political opinions were forged had longrun impacts on current electoral outcomes. While comparing homogeneous communes across the 1815-1860 border, the French side, politicized through Republican secret societies during the early 19th century, voted significantly more for left-wing candidates during the legislative election of 1871. The effect persisted for elections between 1995 and 2022. In other words, politicization had lasting effects, as the treated side still exhibits a preference for the ideological heirs of 19th-century Republicans more than 150 years after the events. The role of political repression in this discontinuity is then further discussed thanks to the number of repressed citizens by communes in 1851. Treated communes that were more repressed in 1851 tend to have a lower preference for left-wing candidates, but the repression does not entirely reverse the initial preference for the left. The repression's memory is likely to have been transmitted through repressed political
dynasties and emigration following the repression. The discontinuity effects on electoral results seem to persist if populations from both sides are relatively unmixed.

## Appendix

## Figure A1: Map of Savoy Duchy and Nice County



Figure A2: Historic timeline of the Duchy of Savoy and Nice County



Date	Reason	Direction
1536	Italian Wars	Duchy of Savoy to France
1559	Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis	France to Duchy of Savoy
1660	Franco-Savoyard War	Duchy of Savoy to France
1601	Treaty of Lyon	France to Duchy of Savoy
1630	Thirty Years' war	Duchy of Savoy to France
1631	Treaty of Cherasco	France to Duchy of Savoy
1690	Nine Years' War	Duchy of Savoy to France
1696	Treaty of Turin	France to Duchy of Savoy
1703	War of the Spanish Succession	Duchy of Savoy to France
1713	Treaty of Utrecht	France to Duchy of Savoy
1742	War of the Austrian Succession	Piedmont Sardinia Kingdom to Spain
1749	Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle	Spain to Piedmont Sardinia Kingdom
1792	Annexation by the French Revolutionary forces	Piedmont Sardinia Kingdom to France
1815	Congress of Vienna	France to Piedmont Sardinia Kingdom
1860	Risorgimento and Italian Unification	Piedmont Sardinia Kingdom to France

Table A1: History of occupations and annexations of Savoy Duchy and Nice County territories

Table A2: Descriptive statistics - Social conflicts (15km bandwidth)

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Total riot: 1700-1789	561	0.148	0.445	0	4
1750-1789	561	0.062	0.249	0	2
Riot against:					
Fiscality	561	0.05	0.240	0	2
State forces	561	0.018	0.132	0	1
Lord	561	0.021	0.157	0	2
Nobles	561	0.007	0.084	0	1
Church	561	0.005	0.094	0	2
Local dignitary	561	0.002	0.042	0	1
Local authorities	561	0.005	0.094	0	2
Religion	561	0.005	0.073	0	1
Other	561	0.012	0.126	0	2





Table A3: Pre-treatment electoral outcomes - Number of left-wing representatives per department

Dep. Var. $LeftRepresentatives_d$	Convention	Conseil	Corps Législatif
	1792-1795	1795-1799	1800-1814
treated $d$	-0.004	-0.016	-0.045
	(0.157)	(0.125)	(0.129)
$\frac{N}{R^2}$	$55\\0.00$	84 0.00	$55\\0.00$

Robust standard errors in parentheses



Figure A4: 1815-1860 border - Social conflicts between 1700 and 1789

Table A4: Post-treatment discontinuities - Migration to Paris

	Number of migrant to Paris	Share of local names in Paris	Share of local names in Paris
	(TRA)	(1890-2000)	(1890-1910)
Treated $_{c}$	-1473.688	-0.005	-0.010
	(976.784)	(0.029)**	(0.301)
$\frac{N}{R^2}$	75	77	14
	0.03	0.05	0.08

Standard errors in parentheses



Figure A5: Share of *Jureur* priest by department (1791)

Figure A6: Post-treatment - Census 1861



Notes: Coefficients estimated at the arrondissement level. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Observations: 37.





Figure A8: Post-treatment - World Wars



*Notes*: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 561.

Dep. Var.:	% of	votes exp	ressed	% of registered voters			
$Vote_c$	Yes	No	Invalid	Yes	No	Invalid	
Treated $_c$	-2.491 (5.303)	6.490 (3.957)	-0.813 (1.041)	-1.301 (4.291)	5.084 (2.991)*	-0.487 (0.712)	
$\frac{N}{R^2}$	$\begin{array}{c} 35 \\ 0.01 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 35 \\ 0.06 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 35 \\ 0.04 \end{array}$	34 0.00	$\begin{array}{c} 34 \\ 0.06 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 34 \\ 0.03 \end{array}$	

Table A5: Treatment on Napoleonic plebiscite of 1870

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A6: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1997-2022) - Relative effect

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	0.043 $(0.019)^{**}$	0.003 (0.029)	0.063 $(0.024)^{***}$	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.016 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.021)	$0.029 \\ (0.025)$
N	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335
$R^2$	0.28	0.19	0.26	0.33	0.32	0.25	0.21
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A7: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Relative effect

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	$0.096 \\ (0.041)^{**}$	-0.002 (0.083)	0.151 $(0.064)^{**}$	$-0.078$ $(0.038)^{**}$	-0.080 (0.170)	-0.159 $(0.068)^{**}$	-0.017 (0.014)
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366
$R^2$	0.33	0.17	0.34	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at  $10 \rm km$  radius.



Figure A9: 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022)



Figure A10: 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022)

Dep. Var.:	Abs	olute	Relative		
$Vote_{m,t}$	Least right Abstention		Least right	Abstention	
Treatment $_m$	$0.246 \\ (0.627)$	$0.646 \\ (0.479)$	$0.005 \\ (0.013)$	$0.033 \\ (0.026)$	
$\frac{N}{R^2}$	3,334 0.74	$\begin{array}{c} 3,335\\ 0.47\end{array}$	$3,334 \\ 0.25$	$3,335 \\ 0.16$	
Commune controls Border Segment FE Election FE	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	

Table A8: Treatment on 2nd round presidential election results (1995-2022)

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A9:	Treatment o	n 2nd	round	legislative	election	results	(1997 - 2022)	)
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Dep. Var.:	Absolute				Relative			
$Vote_{m,t}$	Left	Right	Abstention	Left	Right	Abstention		
Treatment $_m$	5.779 $(2.293)^{**}$	-5.319 (4.442)	-0.323 (0.743)	0.270 $(0.152)^*$	-0.084 $(0.127)$	-0.011 (0.017)		
	3.083	3.083	3.083	3.083	3.083	3.083		
$R^2$	0.69	0.43	0.67	0.16	0.24	0.22		
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at  $10 \rm km$  radius.

Dep. Var.:	Abs	solute vote sl	hare	Relative vote share		
$Vote_{c,t}$	All	All 1965-1995 1995		All	1965-1995	1995-2022
Treatment $_{c}$	4.061 $(1.447)^{***}$	4.610 $(1.489)^{***}$	3.704 (1.699)**	$0.111 \\ (0.041)^{**}$	0.116 $(0.038)^{***}$	0.107 $(0.051)^{**}$
$ \begin{array}{c} N\\ R^2\\ \text{Election FE} \end{array} $	351 0.66 Yes	138 0.73 Yes	213 0.50 Yes	351 0.10 Yes	138 0.17 Yes	213 0.08 Yes

Table A10: Treatment on presidential election results (1965-2022) - Electoral district level, vote for left

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the legislative constituency level

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A11: Treatment on legislative election results (1876-2022) - Electoral district level, vote for left

Dep. Var.:	Abs	solute vote sł	nare	Relative vote share			
$Vote_{c,t}$	All	1876-1997	1997-2022	All	1876-1997	1997-2022	
Treatment $_c$	15.519 $(2.760)^{***}$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		$0.411 \\ (0.068)^{***}$	$0.480 \\ (0.079)^{***}$	$0.183 \\ (0.065)^{***}$	
$egin{array}{c} N \ R^2 \end{array}$	$940 \\ 0.27$	$727 \\ 0.25$	$\begin{array}{c} 213 \\ 0.50 \end{array}$	$940\\0.10$	$727 \\ 0.11$	$213 \\ 0.12$	
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the legislative constituency level

Dep. Var.:	Ab	solute vote s	hare	Relative vote share			
$Vote_{c,t}$	All	1965-1995 1995-2022		All	1965-1995	1995-2022	
Treatment $_{c}$	$-3.897$ $(1.539)^{**}$	$-4.687$ $(1.491)^{***}$	-3.383 (2.017)	-0.070 $(0.029)^{**}$	$-0.081$ $(0.026)^{***}$	-0.063 (0.040)	
$N \\ R^2 \\ Election FE$	351 0.58 Yes	138 0.70 Yes	213 0.43 Yes	351 0.08 Yes	138 0.18 Yes	213 0.05 Yes	

Table A12: Treatment on presidential election results (1876-2022) - Electoral district level, vote for right

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the legislative constituency level

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A13: Treatment on legislative election results (1876-2022) - Electoral district level, vote for right

Dep. Var.:	Abs	solute vote sł	nare	Relative vote share			
$Vote_{c,t}$	All	1876-1997 1997-2022		All	1876-1997	1997-2022	
Treatment $_{c}$	-11.137 (2.280)***	-13.305 $(2.626)^{***}$	-3.898 (3.405)	$-0.274$ $(0.070)^{***}$	$-0.332$ $(0.085)^{***}$	-0.080 (0.071)	
$\frac{N}{B^2}$	940 0.36	727 0.38	213 0.23	$940 \\ 0.04$	7270.04	213	
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the legislative constituency level

Figure A11: Placebo frontiers



Table A14: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022)

Dep. Var.:	South <sub>1</sub>	placebo	North placebo		
$Vote_{m,t}$	Left	Right	Left	Right	
Treatment $_m$	-0.521 (0.734)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.760 \\ (0.751) \end{array}$	$0.740 \\ (0.395)^*$	-0.345 (0.474)	
N	9,372	9,372	10,164	10,164	
$R^2$	0.49	0.27	0.62	0.36	
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.010

Dep. Var.:	South	placebo	North placebo		
$Vote_{m,t}$	Left	Right	Left	Right	
Treatment $_m$	$1.795 \\ (1.246)$	$1.560 \\ (1.818)$	-0.497 (1.038)	$3.592 \\ (2.596)$	
N	9,372	9,372	10,230	10,230	
$R^2$	0.38	0.17	0.56	0.30	
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Table A15: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022)

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A16: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Placebo frontiers

Dep. Var.:	$15 \mathrm{km}$	West	$15 \mathrm{km}$ East		
$Vote_{m,t}$	Left	Right	Left	Right	
Treatment $_m$	-0.558	0.684	-0.463	0.844	
	(0.577)	(0.589)	(0.751)	(0.841)	
N	3,338	3,338	$2,\!618$	$2,\!618$	
$R^2$	0.55	0.59	0.53	0.57	
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius

Dep. Var.:	$15 \mathrm{km}$	West	$15 \mathrm{km} \mathrm{East}$		
$Vote_{m,t}$	Left	Right	Left	Right	
Treatment $_m$	-0.578 (0.709)	$0.759 \\ (0.914)$	-0.257 (0.969)	2.260 (1.496)	
N	3,360	3,360	2,627	2,627	
$R^2$	0.57	0.45	0.55	0.35	
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Table A17: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Placebo frontiers

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A18: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - North subsample

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right			
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Turnout	
Treatment $_m$	1.669 $(0.628)^{***}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.471 \\ (0.483) \end{array}$	1.143 (0.436)***	-0.624 (0.580)	-1.253 $(0.589)^{**}$	$0.629 \\ (0.601)$	$0.668 \\ (0.548)$	
N	2,573	2,573	2,573	2,573	2,573	2,573	2,573	
$R^2$	0.55	0.63	0.84	0.58	0.68	0.57	0.56	
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

		<b>T</b> 0			<b>D</b> • • •			
Dep. Var.:		Left			Right			
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Turnout	
Treatment $_m$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.447 \\ (1.341) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.491 \\ (1.078) \end{array}$	0.011 (1.000)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.521 \\ (1.461) \end{array}$	3.237 (1.117)***	-2.716 $(1.416)^*$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.120 \\ (0.679) \end{array}$	
N	762	762	762	762	762	762	762	
$R^2$	0.53	0.45	0.80	0.48	0.75	0.60	0.54	
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Table A19: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - South subsample

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A20: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - North subsample

Dep. Var.:		Left					
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.449 (1.537)	-0.591 (0.589)	2.040 (1.628)	-2.884 (2.015)	-0.368 (0.872)	-2.516 (1.919)	-0.437 (0.665)
N	2,604	2,604	2,604	2,604	2,604	2,604	2,604
$R^2$	0.58	0.58	0.67	0.39	0.71	0.53	0.58
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

Dep. Var.:		Left					
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Turnout
Treatment $_m$	8.729 $(1.780)^{***}$	2.855 (1.873)	5.874 $(2.541)^{**}$	-8.009 (2.838)***	4.049 (0.955)***	-12.058 (3.072)***	-0.968 (1.015)
N	762	762	762	762	762	762	762
$R^2$	0.60	0.48	0.65	0.43	0.74	0.59	0.53
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A21: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - South subsample

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A22:	Treatment	on 1st	round	presidential	election	results	(1995-2022)	- Chara	.c-
teristics wit	h discontin	uities a	dded						

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.298 $(0.602)^{***}$	1.378 (0.412)***	$0.727 \\ (0.464)$	$-1.753$ $(0.598)^{***}$	-0.069 (0.567)	$-1.684$ $(0.457)^{***}$	$0.021 \\ (0.403)$
Median Income $_m$	$-0.000$ $(0.000)^{***}$	-0.000 (0.000)	$-0.000$ $(0.000)^{***}$	$0.000 \\ (0.000)$	$0.000 \\ (0.000)^{***}$	$-0.000$ $(0.000)^{***}$	$-0.000$ $(0.000)^{***}$
Crop 1800 $_m$	-0.060 $(0.018)^{***}$	-0.041 $(0.010)^{***}$	-0.041 $(0.011)^{***}$	0.067 $(0.019)^{***}$	-0.022 (0.020)	0.089 $(0.020)^{***}$	-0.010 (0.013)
Pop. Density $_m$	0.001 $(0.000)^{***}$	0.000 (0.000)	$0.000 \\ (0.000)$	-0.001 $(0.000)^{***}$	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 $(0.000)^{***}$	$0.002 \\ (0.000)^{***}$
N	2,945	$3,\!085$	2,945	2,945	2,945	2,945	2,945
$R^2$	0.59	0.84	0.63	0.63	0.60	0.74	0.61
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	3.455 $(1.285)^{***}$	$0.151 \\ (0.671)$	$3.304 (1.390)^{**}$	-3.772 $(1.654)^{**}$	-0.152 (0.746)	-3.620 $(1.650)^{**}$	$0.132 \\ (0.407)$
Median Income $_m$	$-0.000$ $(0.000)^{***}$	$-0.000$ $(0.000)^{***}$	$0.000 \\ (0.000)$	$0.000 \\ (0.000)^{***}$	$-0.000$ $(0.000)^{***}$	0.001 $(0.000)^{***}$	$-0.000$ $(0.000)^{***}$
Crop 1800 $_m$	-0.062 (0.039)	-0.025 (0.014)*	-0.037 (0.038)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.010 \\ (0.073) \end{array}$	$0.064 \\ (0.030)^{**}$	-0.054 (0.078)	-0.007 (0.013)
Pop. Density $m$	$0.000 \\ (0.000)$	$-0.001$ $(0.000)^{***}$	0.001 $(0.000)^{***}$	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 $(0.000)^*$	$0.000 \\ (0.001)$	0.001 $(0.000)^{***}$
N	2,946	2,946	2,946	2,946	2,946	2,946	2,946
$R^2$	0.59	0.55	0.67	0.40	0.73	0.55	0.54
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A23: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Characteristics with discontinuities added

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A24	: Treatme	ent on	1st	round	presidential	election	$\operatorname{results}$	(1995-2022)	-	With
population	growth (1	1876-19	911)							

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.291 (0.597)**	$\begin{array}{c} 0.341 \\ (0.453) \end{array}$	$0.920 \ (0.412)^{**}$	-0.370 (0.594)	-0.369 $(0.557)$	-0.001 (0.606)	$0.290 \\ (0.428)$
Pop. growth (1876-1911) $_m$	$0.005 \\ (0.005)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.005 \ (0.003) \end{array}$	$0.000 \\ (0.003)$	-0.002 (0.004)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000 \\ (0.003) \end{array}$	-0.003 (0.005)	0.022 $(0.003)^{***}$
N	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335
$R^2$	0.54	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.69	0.54	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at  $10 \rm km$  radius.

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.853 $(1.285)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.040 \\ (0.647) \end{array}$	2.813 $(1.383)^{**}$	$-3.784$ $(1.658)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.547 \\ (0.727) \end{array}$	$-4.331$ $(1.648)^{***}$	$0.290 \\ (0.428)$
Pop. growth (1876-1911) $_m$	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	$0.006 \\ (0.007)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002\\ (0.004) \end{array}$	$0.004 \\ (0.008)$	0.022 $(0.003)^{***}$
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,335
$R^2$	0.56	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.70	0.52	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A25: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - With population growth (1876-1911)

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p < 0.10,\*\* p < 0.05,\*\*\* p < 0.010

	CDSP (198	5-2004)	PCF (1913-2009)
Dep. Var. $Outcome_{i,d}$	Self-positioned Left	Close to Left party	PCF Members (%)
treated $d$	0.025 $(0.008)^{***}$	0.041 (0.009)***	$0.159 \\ (0.026)^{***}$
N	13,809	$14,\!637$	451
$R^2$	0.01	0.01	0.83
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A26: Treatment on alternative outcomes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Dep. Var.:		Left		Right			
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	
Treatment $_m$	$1.208 \\ (0.590)^{**}$	-0.109 (0.256)	1.317 $(0.537)^{**}$	-1.209 $(0.590)^{**}$	-0.364 $(0.554)$	-0.844 (0.669)	
N	3,335	$3,\!335$	3,335	$3,\!335$	3,335	3,335	
$R^2$	0.56	0.71	0.51	0.56	0.69	0.58	
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Table A27: Presidential elections (1995-2022) - Alternative definition of right and left

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A28: Legislative elections (1997-2022) - Alternative definition of right and lef
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Dep. Var.:		Left		Right			
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	
Treatment $_m$	2.803 $(1.314)^{**}$	$0.040 \\ (0.610)$	$2.763 \ (1.410)^*$	$-4.250$ $(1.060)^{***}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.560 \\ (0.723) \end{array}$	-4.810 $(1.170)^{***}$	
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	
$R^2$	0.56	0.45	0.53	0.62	0.70	0.59	
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at  $10 \rm km$  radius.

Dep. Var.:	Left				Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.334 (1.272)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.384 \\ (0.763) \end{array}$	$0.920 \\ (0.753)$	-0.391 (1.246)	-0.364 (0.901)	-0.027 (0.952)	$0.485 \\ (0.813)$
N	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335
$R^2$	0.54	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.69	0.54	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A29: 1st Round Presidential Election Results (1995-2022) - Alternative cluster at the canton level

\* p < 0.10,\*\* p < 0.05,\*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A30: 1st Round Legislative Election Results (1997-2022) - Alternative cluster at the canton level

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	$2.803 \\ (1.582)^*$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.811) \end{array}$	$2.802 \ (1.513)^*$	-3.725 $(2.032)^*$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.566 \\ (0.761) \end{array}$	$-4.291$ $(1.860)^{**}$	-0.602 (1.203)
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366
$R^2$	0.56	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.70	0.52	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at  $10 \rm km$  radius.

Dep. Var.:	Left						
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.334 (0.643)**	$\begin{array}{c} 0.384 \\ (0.501) \end{array}$	0.920 $(0.436)^{**}$	-0.391 (0.675)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.384 \\ (0.501) \end{array}$	0.920 $(0.436)^{**}$	$0.485 \\ (0.447)$
N	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	$3,\!335$	3,335
$R^2$	0.54	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.56	0.83	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A31: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - 5km spatial clusters

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A32: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - 15km spatial clusters

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.334 (0.642)**	$\begin{array}{c} 0.384 \ (0.436) \end{array}$	$0.920 \\ (0.381)^{**}$	-0.391 (0.612)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.384 \ (0.436) \end{array}$	$0.920 \\ (0.381)^{**}$	$0.485 \\ (0.429)$
N	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335
$R^2$	0.54	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.56	0.83	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 15km radius.

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.803 $(1.179)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.597) \end{array}$	2.802 (1.197)**	-3.725 $(1.530)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.597) \end{array}$	2.802 (1.197)**	-0.602 (0.657)
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366
$R^2$	0.56	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.51	0.66	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A33: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - 5km spatial clusters

\* p < 0.10,\*\* p < 0.05,\*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A34: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - 15km spatial clusters

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.803	0.001	2.802	-3.725 (1.787)**	0.001	2.802	-0.602
	(1.370)	(0.750)	(1.505)	(1.787)	(0.750)	(1.305)	(0.517)
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366
$R^2$	0.56	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.51	0.66	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 15km radius.

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.466 $(0.682)^{**}$	$0.759 \\ (0.485)$	$0.678 \\ (0.497)$	-0.078 (0.698)	-0.305 (0.631)	0.227 (0.753)	-0.007 (0.488)
N	2,216	2,216	2,216	2,216	2,216	2,216	2,216
$R^2$	0.54	0.56	0.84	0.58	0.73	0.55	0.57
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A35: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) -  $10{\rm km}$  band

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

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Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.843 $(1.369)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.108 \\ (0.571) \end{array}$	$2.735 (1.397)^*$	-4.042 $(1.653)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.368 \\ (0.754) \end{array}$	-4.410 $(1.703)^{***}$	-1.217 (0.644)*
N	2,238	2,238	2,238	2,238	2,238	2,238	2,238
$R^2$	0.56	0.53	0.66	0.41	0.72	0.55	0.59
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	$1.141 \\ (0.593)^*$	$0.456 \\ (0.439)$	$0.675 \\ (0.412)$	-0.255 $(0.577)$	-0.211 (0.519)	-0.044 (0.580)	$0.192 \\ (0.418)$
	3,769	3,769	3,769	3,769	3,769	3,769	3,769
$R^2$	0.54	0.55	0.83	0.58	0.69	0.53	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A37: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - 20km band

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A38: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - 20km band

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.661 $(1.316)^{**}$	-0.168 (0.660)	2.829 $(1.397)^{**}$	-3.306 $(1.717)^*$	$0.838 \\ (0.717)$	$-4.144$ $(1.679)^{**}$	-0.599 (0.540)
N	3,804	3,804	3,804	3,804	3,804	3,804	3,804
$R^2$	0.55	0.48	0.65	0.39	0.69	0.52	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A39: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - 25km band

Dep. Var.:	Left				Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.693 $(0.552)^{***}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.312 \\ (0.410) \end{array}$	1.343 $(0.355)^{***}$	-1.595 $(0.552)^{***}$	-2.112 (0.517)***	$0.518 \\ (0.549)$	$-0.887$ $(0.355)^{**}$
N	5,161	5,161	5,161	5,161	5,161	5,161	5,161
$R^2$	0.53	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.69	0.51	0.54
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at  $10 \rm km$  radius.

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.622 $(1.141)^{**}$	-0.719 (0.573)	3.341 (1.228)***	-4.890 $(1.609)^{***}$	-0.624 (0.686)	$-4.265$ $(1.612)^{***}$	-1.438 $(0.480)^{***}$
N	5,196	5,196	5,196	5,196	5,196	5,196	5,196
$R^2$	0.53	0.46	0.61	0.37	0.68	0.49	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A40: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - 25km band

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A41: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) -  $30{\rm km}$  band

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.781 \\ (0.524) \end{array}$	-0.276 (0.375)	1.018 (0.349)***	$-0.939$ $(0.537)^*$	-2.935 $(0.552)^{***}$	1.995 $(0.587)^{***}$	-0.615 $(0.333)^*$
N	6,185	6,185	6,185	6,185	$6,\!185$	6,185	6,185
$R^2$	0.53	0.56	0.82	0.57	0.68	0.51	0.53
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at  $10 \rm km$  radius.

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A42: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - 30km band

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	$1.539 \\ (1.108)$	-1.503 $(0.609)^{**}$	3.042 (1.197)**	-4.697 $(1.669)^{***}$	-1.190 (0.707)*	-3.508 $(1.679)^{**}$	-1.113 (0.489)**
N	6,220	6,220	6,220	6,220	6,220	6,220	6,220
$R^2$	0.53	0.44	0.59	0.37	0.66	0.49	0.54
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Turnout
Treatment $_m$	1.858 $(0.579)^{***}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.516 \\ (0.455) \end{array}$	1.320 (0.377)***	-1.185 $(0.635)^*$	-0.171 (0.553)	-0.213 (0.610)	$-0.894$ $(0.376)^{**}$
N	4,635	3,864	$4,\!659$	2,846	3,347	3,311	4,689
$R^2$	0.53	0.57	0.83	0.58	0.70	0.54	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal Band (km)	22.616	14.876	15.135	12.783	22.292	17.817	22.157

Table A43: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Optimal bands

\* p < 0.10,\*\* p < 0.05,\*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A44: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Optimal bands

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Turnout
Treatment $_m$	4.058 $(1.325)^{***}$	0.170 (0.668)	2.517 (1.365)*	-4.649 (1.675)***	0.672 (0.707)	-5.702 (1.681)***	-1.618 (0.512)***
N	2,670	3,354	2,244	2,538	4,143	2,784	4,550
$R^2$	0.55	0.52	0.66	0.39	0.69	0.53	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal Band (km)	11.7	14.953	10.138	11.269	19.433	12.412	21.633

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.



Figure A12: Presidential 1st round, vote for left - drop commune

Table A45: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Without merged communes

Dep. Var.:		Left					
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	$1.193 \\ (0.600)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.356 \ (0.452) \end{array}$	$0.809 \ (0.417)^*$	-0.226 (0.586)	-0.240 (0.551)	$0.013 \\ (0.600)$	$0.452 \\ (0.434)$
N	3,251	3,251	3,251	3,251	3,251	3,251	3,251
$R^2$	0.54	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.69	0.54	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes



Figure A13: Legislative 1st round, vote for left - drop commune

Table A46: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Without merged communes

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.655 $(1.301)^{**}$	-0.004 (0.661)	$2.659 \\ (1.387)^*$	-3.507 $(1.689)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.667 \\ (0.736) \end{array}$	$-4.174$ $(1.684)^{**}$	-0.516 $(0.558)$
N	3,282	3,282	3,282	3,282	3,282	3,282	3,282
$R^2$	0.56	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.70	0.52	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes





Table A47: Descriptive statistics - 1851 political repression (15km bandwidth)

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Repressed Repressed (per 1000)	$\begin{array}{c} 561 \\ 561 \end{array}$	$0.198 \\ 0.136$	$\begin{array}{c} 1.684 \\ 0.915 \end{array}$	0 0	$31 \\ 13.827$

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right				
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention		
Treatment $_m$	1.406 (0.662)**	$ \begin{array}{c} 0.245 \\ (0.522) \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{r} 1.136 \\ (0.441)^{***} \end{array} $	-0.495 (0.648)	-1.006 (0.563)*	$ \begin{array}{c} 0.511 \\ (0.671) \end{array} $	0.676 (0.483)		
5km Repression $_m$	-0.003 (0.731)	-1.205 $(0.516)^{**}$	$1.206 \ (0.645)^*$	-1.724 (0.853)**	-4.638 $(0.590)^{***}$	2.914 $(0.793)^{***}$	$0.014 \\ (0.702)$		
Treatment $_m$ x 5km $_m$	-0.194 (0.822)	$1.130 \\ (0.544)^{**}$	$-1.338$ $(0.700)^*$	$1.361 \\ (0.925)$	4.639 $(0.684)^{***}$	-3.278 $(0.833)^{***}$	-0.524 (0.742)		
N	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335		
$R^2$	0.54	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.69	0.54	0.55		
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Table A48: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Interaction with 5km repression circles

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A49: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Interaction with 5km repression circles

Dep. Var.:		Left					
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	$2.702 (1.429)^*$	-0.095 (0.701)	2.797 $(1.511)^*$	-3.771 $(1.711)^{**}$	$0.202 \\ (0.746)$	-3.973 $(1.694)^{**}$	-0.875 (0.661)
5km Repression $_m$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.381 \\ (1.372) \end{array}$	-1.439 $(0.480)^{***}$	1.819 (1.332)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.530 \\ (2.054) \end{array}$	$-2.177$ $(1.045)^{**}$	2.707 (2.055)	-0.446 (0.922)
Treatment $_m$ x 5km $_m$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.034 \\ (1.504) \end{array}$	$1.165 \\ (0.564)^{**}$	-1.131 (1.498)	-0.207 (2.241)	$2.360 \\ (0.989)^{**}$	-2.567 (2.201)	1.021 (0.995)
$\frac{N}{R^2}$	$3,366 \\ 0.56$	$3,366 \\ 0.51$	$3,366 \\ 0.66$	$3,366 \\ 0.40$	$3,366 \\ 0.70$	$3,366 \\ 0.52$	$3,366 \\ 0.56$
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.017 (0.901)	$0.299 \\ (0.562)$	0.684 (0.612)	-0.511 (0.927)	-0.460 (0.744)	-0.050 (0.868)	$0.683 \\ (0.550)$
10km Repression $_{m}$	-2.401 (0.506)***	$-0.967$ $(0.408)^{**}$	-1.413 (0.331)***	1.748 (0.498)***	$\begin{array}{c} 0.101 \\ (0.399) \end{array}$	1.647 (0.435)***	$0.246 \\ (0.307)$
Treatment $_m$ x 10km $_m$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.311 \\ (0.748) \end{array}$	$0.064 \\ (0.490)$	$0.253 \\ (0.463)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.273 \\ (0.774) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.143 \\ (0.617) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.131 \\ (0.682) \end{array}$	-0.266 (0.378)
N	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335
$R^2$	0.55	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.69	0.54	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A50: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Interaction with 10km repression circles

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A51:	Treatment	on $1st$	round	legislative	election	$\operatorname{results}$	(1997 - 2022)	) -	Interaction
with 10km	repression a	circles							

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	$3.353 \\ (1.746)^*$	-0.280 (0.778)	$3.633 \\ (1.897)^*$	$-5.583$ $(2.084)^{***}$	$0.608 \\ (1.015)$	-6.192 $(2.051)^{***}$	-0.469 (0.776)
10km Repression $_m$	$-2.285$ $(0.758)^{***}$	$-0.957$ $(0.431)^{**}$	-1.328 (0.773)*	$1.465 \\ (1.056)$	-0.041 (0.540)	$1.506 \\ (1.131)$	-0.516 (0.323)
Treatment $_m$ x 10km $_m$	-0.926 (1.195)	$0.340 \\ (0.618)$	-1.266 (1.293)	2.738 (1.704)	-0.062 (0.736)	2.800 (1.714)	-0.223 (0.538)
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366
$R^2$	0.57	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.70	0.53	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at  $10 \rm km$  radius

		тс			D: 14		
Dep. var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.433 (0.601)**	0.407 (0.455)	$0.995 \\ (0.421)^{**}$	-0.451 (0.589)	-0.419 (0.549)	-0.032 (0.607)	0.499 (0.446)
Repression (binary) $_{m}$	-0.956 $(0.405)^{**}$	-0.222 (0.286)	-0.718 $(0.296)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.581 \\ (0.459) \end{array}$	$0.525 \\ (0.414)$	$0.056 \\ (0.418)$	-0.127 (0.357)
N	$3,\!335$	$3,\!335$	$3,\!335$	$3,\!335$	$3,\!335$	$3,\!335$	3,335
$R^2$	0.54	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.69	0.54	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A52: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Repression binary variable

\* p < 0.10,\*\* p < 0.05,\*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A53: Treatment on 1st round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Repression binary variable

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.895 $(1.322)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.012 \\ (0.653) \end{array}$	2.883 $(1.411)^{**}$	-3.876 $(1.693)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.523 \\ (0.723) \end{array}$	$-4.399$ $(1.681)^{***}$	-0.685 (0.569)
Repression (binary) $_m$	-0.898 (0.657)	-0.109 (0.306)	-0.789 (0.634)	$1.474 \\ (0.850)^*$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.421 \\ (0.401) \end{array}$	1.053 (0.844)	$0.802 \\ (0.374)^{**}$
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366
$R^2$	0.56	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.70	0.52	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at  $10 \rm km$  radius

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	$1.360 \\ (0.598)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.381 \\ (0.452) \end{array}$	$0.946 \\ (0.419)^{**}$	-0.411 (0.585)	-0.381 (0.550)	-0.029 (0.606)	$0.524 \\ (0.443)$
Repressed (per thousand) $_{m}$	-0.067 (0.097)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.006 \\ (0.062) \end{array}$	-0.067 (0.079)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.051 \\ (0.099) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.044 \\ (0.090) \end{array}$	$0.008 \\ (0.104)$	-0.100 (0.095)
$\frac{N}{R^2}$	$3,335 \\ 0.54$	$3,335 \\ 0.56$	$3,335 \\ 0.83$	$3,335 \\ 0.58$	$3,335 \\ 0.69$	$3,335 \\ 0.54$	$3,335 \\ 0.55$
Commune controls Border Segment FE Election FE	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes

Table A54: Treatment on 1st round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Per thousand inhabitants repressed

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A55:	Treatment	on 1st rour	d legislative	election	results (	1997-2022)	- Per t	housand
inhabitants	repressed							

Dep. Var.:	Left			Right			
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.808 $(1.319)^{**}$	-0.008 (0.653)	2.816 (1.409)**	-3.828 $(1.694)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.548 \\ (0.724) \end{array}$	$-4.376$ $(1.683)^{***}$	-0.609 (0.566)
Repressed (per thousand) $_{m}$	-0.013 (0.145)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.024 \\ (0.075) \end{array}$	-0.036 (0.140)	$0.269 \\ (0.221)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.046 \\ (0.107) \end{array}$	$0.223 \\ (0.200)$	$0.019 \\ (0.105)$
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366
$R^2$	0.56	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.70	0.52	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius
Don Var ·		Loft			Bight		
Dep. var		Dett			Tugitt		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	$     1.780 \\     (0.631)^{***} $	0.518 (0.487)	$     1.207 \\     (0.440)^{***} $	-0.720 (0.588)	-1.325 (0.584)**	0.604 (0.612)	$0.605 \\ (0.555)$
Repressed $_m$	-0.958 $(0.253)^{***}$	-0.403 $(0.193)^{**}$	$-0.554$ $(0.202)^{***}$	$0.830 \\ (0.293)^{***}$	0.617 $(0.274)^{**}$	$0.214 \\ (0.184)$	$0.549 \\ (0.221)^{**}$
N	2,573	2,573	2,573	2,573	2,573	2,573	2,573
$R^2$	0.55	0.63	0.84	0.59	0.68	0.57	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A56: Presidential, number of repressed individuals by commune - North subsample

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.430 \\ (1.346) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.493 \\ (1.079) \end{array}$	-0.008 (1.001)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.533 \\ (1.462) \end{array}$	3.310 $(1.118)^{***}$	$-2.777$ $(1.423)^*$	-0.032 (0.693)
Repressed $_m$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.016 \\ (0.029) \end{array}$	-0.003 (0.025)	0.017 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.030)	$-0.066$ $(0.037)^*$	$0.055 \\ (0.041)$	$0.137 \\ (0.033)^{***}$
N	762	762	762	762	762	762	762
$R^2$	0.53	0.45	0.80	0.48	0.75	0.60	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A57: Presidential, number of repressed individuals by commune - South subsample

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A58: Legislative, number of repressed individuals by commune - North subsample

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.531 (1.537)	-0.554 $(0.588)$	2.085 (1.627)	-3.022 (2.015)	-0.415 (0.869)	-2.608 (1.920)	-0.545 (0.661)
Repressed $_m$	-0.718 $(0.374)^*$	-0.325 $(0.191)^*$	-0.394 (0.348)	1.214 (0.503)**	$0.408 \\ (0.279)$	$0.807 \ (0.456)^*$	0.941 (0.257)***
N	2,604	2,604	2,604	2,604	2,604	2,604	2,604
$R^2$	0.58	0.58	0.67	0.39	0.71	0.53	0.58
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	8.803 $(1.784)^{***}$	2.884 (1.888)	5.919 $(2.563)^{**}$	-8.218 $(2.833)^{***}$	4.097 $(0.950)^{***}$	-12.316 $(3.064)^{***}$	-1.112 (1.000)
Repressed $_m$	-0.067 (0.056)	-0.026 (0.034)	-0.040 (0.061)	$0.189 \\ (0.084)^{**}$	-0.044 (0.040)	0.233 $(0.069)^{***}$	$0.130 \\ (0.046)^{***}$
N	762	762	762	762	762	762	762
$R^2$	0.60	0.48	0.65	0.43	0.74	0.60	0.53
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A59: Legislative, number of repressed individuals by commune - South subsample

Table A60: Descriptive statistics - Repressed-political dynasties (15km bandwidth)

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Mayor Length mayor	561 561	$0.069 \\ 1.057 \\ 0.004$	$0.254 \\ 5.031 \\ 2.054$	0 0	$\frac{1}{56}$

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.398 (0.613)**	$0.366 \\ (0.459)$	$0.994 \\ (0.422)^{**}$	-0.450 (0.589)	-0.476 (0.573)	$0.026 \\ (0.609)$	0.463 (0.448)
Mayor $_m$	-0.104 (0.727)	-0.289 (0.643)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.116 \ (0.334) \end{array}$	$0.206 \\ (0.777)$	$0.048 \\ (0.674)$	$0.158 \\ (0.709)$	$0.225 \\ (0.507)$
Treatment $_m$ x Mayor $_m$	-1.184 (0.932)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.105 \\ (0.816) \end{array}$	-1.203 (0.456)***	$1.164 \\ (1.004)$	$1.966 \\ (0.829)^{**}$	-0.803 (0.888)	$0.545 \\ (0.646)$
N	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335
$R^2$	0.54	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.69	0.54	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A61: Presidential elections (1995-2022) - Interaction with may or having the same name as repressed citizens 20km around

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table	A62:	Legislative	elections	(1997-2022)	) –	Interaction	with	mayor	having	the	same
name	as rep	pressed citiz	ens 20km	around							

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.904 (1.331)**	$\begin{array}{c} 0.049 \\ (0.688) \end{array}$	2.854 $(1.405)^{**}$	-3.696 $(1.662)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.412 \\ (0.735) \end{array}$	$-4.108$ $(1.642)^{**}$	-0.779 (0.580)
Mayor $_m$	$0.258 \\ (1.151)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.485 \\ (0.986) \end{array}$	-0.227 (0.843)	$1.011 \\ (1.361)$	-0.515 (0.771)	$1.526 \\ (1.577)$	-0.506 (0.548)
Treatment $_m$ x Mayor $_m$	-1.577 (1.385)	-0.514 (1.016)	-1.063 (1.178)	$0.163 \\ (1.785)$	2.336 $(1.020)^{**}$	-2.173 (2.068)	2.728 (0.720)***
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366
$R^2$	0.56	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.70	0.52	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	1.388 (0.598)**	0.425 (0.456)	$0.932 \\ (0.416)^{**}$	-0.437 (0.583)	-0.319 (0.559)	-0.118 (0.604)	0.483 (0.445)
Length $_m$	0.070 $(0.029)^{**}$	$0.046 \ (0.026)^*$	$0.023 \ (0.011)^{**}$	-0.060 $(0.030)^{**}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.034 \\ (0.027) \end{array}$	-0.094 $(0.031)^{***}$	-0.012 (.)
Treatment $_m$ x Length $_m$	-0.137 $(0.037)^{***}$	-0.063 $(0.031)^{**}$	-0.073 $(0.019)^{***}$	0.118 $(0.039)^{***}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.017 \\ (0.032) \end{array}$	$0.101 \\ (0.043)^{**}$	$0.050 \\ (0.019)^{***}$
N	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335	3,335
$R^2$	0.54	0.56	0.83	0.58	0.69	0.54	0.55
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A63: Presidential elections (1995-2022) - Interaction with number of years with mayor having the same name as repressed citizens 20km around

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A64: Legislative elections (1997-2022) - Interaction with number of years with mayor having the same name as repressed citizens 20km around

Dep. Var.:		Left			Right		
$Vote_{m,t}$	All	Far	Moderate	All	Far	Moderate	Abstention
Treatment $_m$	2.880 $(1.318)^{**}$	$0.097 \\ (0.678)$	2.784 $(1.394)^{**}$	-3.736 $(1.658)^{**}$	0.607 (0.720)	$-4.343$ $(1.642)^{***}$	-0.558 $(0.568)$
Length $_m$	0.093 $(0.044)^{**}$	$0.097 \\ (0.053)^*$	-0.004 (0.029)	-0.017 (0.046)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030 \\ (0.037) \end{array}$	-0.047 (0.052)	0.028 (0.006)***
Treatment $_m$ x Length $_m$	-0.159 $(0.053)^{***}$	-0.098 $(0.051)^*$	-0.061 (0.043)	0.044 (0.063)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.024\\ (0.047) \end{array}$	$0.020 \\ (0.075)$	0.051 (0.022)**
N	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366	3,366
$R^2$	0.56	0.51	0.66	0.40	0.70	0.52	0.56
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election $\overline{\text{FE}}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Emigration	561	0.032	0.399	0	9
Exile	561	0.007	0.084	0	1
French Guiana	561	0.002	0.042	0	1
Algeria	561	0.005	0.094	0	2

Table A65: Descriptive statistics - 1851 emigration (15km bandwidth)

Table A66: Treatment on 2nd round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Subsamples with academic division

Dep. Var.: VoteLeastRight <sub>m t</sub>	Same academia	Different academia
<u>5</u> mi,e		
Treatment $_m$	-1.108	1.269
	(0.982)	$(0.744)^*$
N	1,797	$1,\!537$
$R^2$	0.74	0.75
Commune controls	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A67: Treatment on 2nd round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Subsamples with academic division

Dep. Var.:	Same academia		Different academia	
$Vote_{m,t}$	Left	Right	Left	Right
Treatment $_m$	1.811 (3.708)	1.666 $(5.626)$	8.318 (2.385)***	-11.210
	(0.100)	(0.020)	(2.000)	(0.102)
N	$1,\!651$	$1,\!651$	$1,\!432$	$1,\!432$
$R^2$	0.70	0.49	0.72	0.45
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at  $10 \rm km$  radius

















Dep. Var.:	Same	Different
$VoteLeastRight_{m,t}$	zone	zone
Treatment $_m$	0.586	3.101
	(0.642)	$(1.302)^{**}$
N	1,657	1,677
$R^2$	0.75	0.74
Commune controls	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes

Table A68: Treatment on 2nd round presidential election results (1995-2022) - Subsamples with employment zone

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.010

Table A69: Treatment on 2nd round legislative election results (1997-2022) - Subsamples with employment zone

Dep. Var.:	Same zone		Different zone	
$Vote_{m,t}$	Left	Right	Left	Right
Treatment $_m$	$1.312 \\ (2.541)$	-3.381 (5.420)	6.179 $(2.870)^{**}$	-4.358 (8.113)
N	1501	1501	1582	1582
$R^2$	0.70	0.53	0.69	0.36
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at  $10 \rm km$  radius

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